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2020 will be a year forever marked by the Covid-19 pandemic.  The year will also be 
remembered for the death of George Floyd at the hands of police officer Derek Chauvin.  The 
death was recorded by a bystander’s cell phone and broadcast all over the world to see.  This 
video proved pivotal in the prosecution and conviction of Chauvin for Floyd’s death.  The video 
provided powerful evidence highlighting the importance of incorporating video evidence into the 
investigation and prosecution of crime.   
 
Today, police use a variety of video evidence to assist in their investigations.  In some 
cases, it may be a small part of the case whereas in others it may provide vital evidence.  There 
has been an explosion in the number of video sources where police can now gather evidence.  
Cellphone videos, private security cameras on homes or businesses, social media postings, and 
police body cameras all provide possible evidence that must be collected, extracted and 
analyzed.  In 2019, there were 40 million professionally installed video recording systems and 
224 million smartphones in the U.S. alone.  Along with the approximately 400,000 body cameras 
worldwide, there is a numerous amount of video available to investigators.  
  
It is important for police departments to acquire this video evidence according to legal 
requirements and best practices according to industry leaders to avoid any future legal 
challenges to the evidence. This study will analyze how police departments around the country 
are handling video evidence through their Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) using legal 
requirements and industry best practices as a guideline.  The author chose to concentrate on two 
of the main legal challenges facing law enforcement today while working with digital evidence: 
authentication and integrity.  Despite sometimes being used interchangeably, authentication and 
integrity present two different challenges when working with digital evidence.  Authentication is 
when the evidence put forth in a trial is what the party admitting it into evidence claims it to be.  
Integrity is ensuring the evidence has not been changed or altered since its original form.  In this 
study, the author chose to concentrate on the issues of authentication and integrity specifically 
in relation to Digital Multimedia Evidence (DME).  DME is information of probative value stored 
in binary form including but not limited to tape, film, magnetic, optical media, and/or the 
information contained therein. 
 
 The author created a rubric utilizing best practices identified by industry leaders along 
with legal guidelines set forth by the Federal Rules of Evidence, court cases, and law reviews.  The 
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 The death of George Floyd brought to public light many issues in policing today.  One 
problem the case shined a light on is the importance of video evidence in police investigations. 
The most crucial witness in the case was the cellphone video taken by a bystander.  This evidence 
was pivotal in bringing charges against officer Derek Chauvin.  What would have happened to the 
case if the lead investigator not recover the bystander video?  What if that video came from the 
building’s surveillance system and was overwritten before investigating units could retrieve it?  
The recovery and handling of video surveillance or digital multimedia evidence (DME) is a crucial 
component of police investigations today.  Without it we might have never fully understood the 
George Floyd case.  There was video surveillance footage, Body Worn Camera video, and In-Car 
Camera video, along with the cellphone video.  All of these methods of capturing an incident 
were utilized by the prosecution in the case against Chauvin.   
 The prevalence of security camera systems across the country has exploded in recent 
years.  Including the number of cellphones, body cameras, and in-car cameras, most aspects of 
our daily lives are being recorded by some sort form of video.  Around the world, approximately 
6 billion hours of video are recorded every hour (Friese, 2019).  According to data presented by 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 2019 conference, in 2019 there were: 
• 40 million professionally installed video recording systems in the U.S. 
• 224 million smartphones in the U.S. 
• 98 million network surveillance cameras in the world 
• 29 million CCTV surveillance cameras in the world 
• 400,000 body cameras worldwide (Friese, 2019) 
In addition to all the surveillance and cellphone footage available, the Scientific Working 
Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) provides additional resources that could aid in investigations: 
• Municipal surveillance systems (downtown cameras, pole cameras) 
• Public Transportation 
• Freeway and Toll Road Cameras 
• Rideshare, Taxi, or private dash recording systems 
• Commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) 
• Video gaming consoles 
• Social media platforms 
• News media outlet websites 
• Game and wildlife cameras 
• Cloud-based video storage solutions (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 
2021, p. 5) 
A digital forensic detective who has worked with video evidence for the past ten years 





of growth in video retrieval for his agency which covers a municipal jurisdiction of approximately 
100,000 residents: 
• 2013: 331 videos, 19.76 GBs 
• 2014: 6595 videos, 279.81 GBs  
• 2015: 13,013 videos, 540.97 GBs 
• 2016: 17,154 videos, 788.65 GBs 
• 2017: 19,801 videos, 1092.47 GBs 
• 2018: 43,870 videos, 1752.45 GBs 
• 2019: 34,590 videos, 2474.04 GBs (Paxton, 2020) 
 
The need for law 
enforcement personnel to 
utilize this evidence has also 
increased dramatically.  All of 
this video is possible evidence 
that can be utilized to solve 
crimes and prosecute 
offenders.  It is important to 
recover this evidence and 
ensure that the evidence is 
being recovered in the right way 
to verify the right person is 
being charged with a crime.  It is 
also important to properly 
handle this massive amount of 
evidence and ensure integrity in 
investigations.  In discussing the 
importance of digital evidence in 
homicide investigations, the 
Police Executive Research Forum 
(PERF) identified the challenges 
of handling digital evidence 
compared to traditional forms of 
physical evidence such as 
fingerprints or DNA.  Digital 
evidence contains a wider array 
of source material, can sometimes contain personally sensitive information and requires 
specialized training and equipment (Police Executive Research Forum, 2018).  The National 
Institute of Justice (2020) further explains proper seizure of technological devices must be done 
correctly due to the volatile nature of the data to preserve the integrity of the data and ensure 
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Figure A. Growth in video retrieval for a police department covering a 




Police departments will need a thorough and comprehensive network of procedures to 
properly handle the challenges they face with collecting, extracting, and analyzing digital 
evidence.  This report will look at how departments train their members in the best practices in 
handling digital multimedia evidence (DME) by evaluating their Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs).  In discussing the importance of a policy and procedure manual,  (Orrick, n.d.) states when 
a policy and procedure manual is adequately developed and implemented, it provides staff with 
information to act decisively, consistently, and legally.  It also ensures department personnel are 
prepared for any unusual circumstances and identifies the correct course of action. 
The following definitions will be used as key terms throughout this report.  The author 
includes the definitions for Digital Evidence and Digital Multimedia Evidence.  The author chose 
to concentrate specifically on Digital Multimedia Evidence for this research but utilized sources 
and materials that do not distinguish between the two. 
 Digital Multimedia Evidence (DME): information of probative value stored or transmitted in 
binary form including, but not limited to, tape, film, magnetic and optical media, and/or the 
information contained therein. (Law Enforcement and Emergency Services Video Association, 
UNK, p. 4) 
Digital Evidence: Information of probative value that is stored or transmitted in binary form 
(Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016, p. 7).  
 
The following definitions are provided to assist in the reading of this report.  They are 
taken directly from SWGDE’s Digital & Multimedia Evidence Glossary (2016, pp.4-19): 
• CD/DVD: Optical Disc formats designed to function as digital storage media. 
• Chain of Custody: The chronological documentation of the movement, location and 
possession of evidence. 
• Copy: An accurate reproduction of information. 
• Data: Information in analog or digital form that can be transmitted or processed. 
Digital Video Recorders (DVR): primarily found in residential, commercial, or 
governmental institutions and include these major types: 
• Stand-Alone Embedded Digital Video Recorder 
• Stand-Alone Embedded Network Video Recorder 
• Hybrid Digital Recorder 
• Dedicated Computer 
• Personal Computer 
• Serve-Based (only accessible by client station)  




• Data Extraction: A process that identifies and recovers information that may not be 
immediately apparent. 
• Digital Evidence: Information of probative value that is stored or transmitted in binary 
form. 
• Downloading/Exporting: The process of retrieving audio, video, and still images and 
transactional data from a DVR system.  Can be in either the native/proprietary format 
or an open format. 
• DVR (Digital Video Recorder): a stand-along embedded system or a computer-based 
system used to record video and/or audio data. 
• Integrity Verification: The process of confirming that the data presented is complete 
and unaltered since time of acquisition. 
• Media: Objects on which data can be stored. 
• Metadata: Data, frequently embedded within a file, that describes a file or directory, 
which can include the locations where the content is stored, dates and times, 
application specific information, and permissions. 
• Multimedia Evidence: Analog or digital media, including, but not limited to, film, tape, 
magnetic and optical media, and/or the information contained therein. 
• Original Image: An accurate and complete replica of the primary image, irrespective 
of media.  For film and analog video, the primary image is the original image. 
• Physical Copy: An accurate reproduction of information contained on the physical 
device. 
• Proprietary File Format: Any file format that is unique to a specific manufacturer or 
product. 
• Triage: The process by which items considered for collection or analysis are prioritized 
to determine the order in which they should be collected and/or analyzed, if at all. 
• Verification: 1) The process of confirming the accuracy of an item to its original. 2) 
Confirmation that a tool, technique or procedure performs as expected. 
• Video: The electronic representation of a sequence of images, depicting either 
stationary or moving scenes.  It may include audio. 
• Video Analysis: The scientific examination, comparison, and/or evaluation of video in 
legal matters. 
• Video Security Recording System: One of more cameras connected to a recording 
device capable of storing analog or digital video information. 
• Work Copy: A copy or duplicate of a recording or data that can be used for subsequent 






The 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to a speedy and public 
trial, the right to an impartial jury, to confront the witnesses against the accused, and the right 
to have an attorney present.  While this is not a complete list of the rights guaranteed by the 6th 
Amendment, it highlights the point made by the founding fathers of a fair and impartial jury (Sixth 
Amendment, n.d.).  When conducting investigations, police departments should make every 
attempt to ensure they are collecting and presenting evidence that abides by the principles of 
the 6th Amendment.  To guarantee the evidence they put forth results in every citizen receiving 
a fair and impartial trial, police departments need to ensure the evidence they produce in court 
is what they, in fact, say it is.  Goodison et al. (2015) identified the issue of authentication and 
chain of custody as one of the leading legal challenges facing law enforcement when working 
with digital evidence.  They define authentication as the “process of establishing that the 
evidence is actually what its proponents claim it to be,” meaning the party introducing the 
evidence at court is required to show the evidence is genuine.  Part of the authentication process 
is chain of custody, which assures the evidence was preserved in its original form (Goodison et 
al., 2015, p. 11).  Similarly, the terms “Integrity” and “Authentication” are sometimes 
interchanged.  Integrity Verification looks to answer if the evidence has been changed or altered; 
Authentication seeks to answer if the evidence accurately represents what it purports to be (Law 
Enforcement and Emergency Services Video Association, 2010).  By addressing these legal 
challenges and understanding what the courts are ruling regarding digital evidence, police 
departments will be better equipped to establish best practices in their policies and procedures. 
Authentication and the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Digital evidence that is recovered during an investigation may go through 
“authentication” during trial.  Authentication is “the process by which a party attempting to have 
some sort of evidence admitted at trial must provide sufficient evidence so that a reasonable 
juror can conclude that the evidence the party seeks to admit is what that party claims it to be” 
(Rule 901.Authenticating or Identifying Evidence, n.d., para. 1).  In the Federal court system, 
authentication of evidence is guided by the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, several rules help provide guidance on digital evidence.  One of those rules, Rule 
901.Authenticating or Identifying Evidence (n.d.), states the following: 
(a) In General, to satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, 
the proponent must produce evidence sufficient enough to support a finding that the 
item is what the proponent claims it is. 
(b) Examples.  The following are examples only – not a complete list – of evidence that 
satisfies the requirement: 
(1) Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge 
(2) Nonexpert Opinion about Handwriting 
(3) Comparison by an Expert Witness of the Trier of Fact 
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like 




(6) Evidence about a Telephone Conversation 
(7) Evidence about Public Records 
(8) Evidence about Ancient Documents or Data Compilations 
(9) Evidence about a Process or System 
(10) Methods Provided by a Statute or Rule (para. 1) 
Concerning digital evidence, the most important examples in Rule 901 are examples (b)(1) 
and (9).  Example (b)(1) states, “testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be” (Rule 
901.Authenticating or Identifying Evidence, n.d., para. 1).  Example (b)(1) would pertain to 
homeowners testifying to footage collected from their surveillance system or law enforcement 
personnel testifying to digital evidence they recovered, processed, or produced in the course of 
their investigation.  Example (b)(9) states: “evidence describing a process or system and showing 
it produces an accurate result” (Cornell Law School, n.d., para. 1).  Example (b)(9) helps guide the 
systems that produce digital evidence such as computers, cameras, video recorders, DVR’s, NVR’s 
or other surveillance systems.  Rule (b)(9) is designed for situations where the accuracy of a result 
depends on the process that produces that result.  In following up Rule 901, Rule 902-Evidence 
that is Self-Authenticating (n.d.) states the following: 
The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence of 
authenticity in order to be admitted: 
(1) Domestic Public Documents That Are Sealed and Signed 
(2) Domestic Public Documents That Are Not Sealed but Are Signed and Certified 
(3) Foreign Public Documents 
(4) Certified Copies of Public Records 
(5) Official Publications 
(6) Newspapers and Periodicals 
(7) Trade Inscriptions and the Like 
(8) Acknowledged Documents 
(9) Commercial Paper and Related Documents 
(10) Presumptions Under a Federal Statute 
(11) Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity 
(12) Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity 
(13) Certified Records Generated by an Electronic Process or System 
(14) Certified Data Copied from an Electronic Device, Storage Medium, or File  
(para. 1) 
Similar to Rule 901, there are certain sections of Rule 902 that can be applied directly to 
digital evidence.  902(13) states: 
A record generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate 
result as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the 
certification requirements of Rule 902 (11) and (12).  The proponent of the 
evidence must also meet the notice requirements of Rule 902 (11) (para. 1). 
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This amendment provides a procedure where authenticating specific electronic evidence 
can be done without utilizing the testimony of a foundation witness.  This amendment was 
established to alleviate the expense and inconvenience of producing a witness to authenticate 
an item of electronic evidence.  Under this Rule, a proponent seeking to establish authenticity 
must present a certification containing the same information that would be sufficient to establish 
authenticity from information provided by a witness at trial.  The new rule allows the authenticity 
foundation that satisfies Rule 901(b)(9) to be established by certification instead of testimony 
from a witness (Rule 902. Evidence that is Self-Authenticating, n.d.).  Rule 902 (14) states: “data 
copied from an electronic device, storage medium, or file, if authenticated by a process of digital 
identification, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification 
requirements of Rule 902 (11) or (12)” (Rule 902. Evidence that is Self Authenticating, n.d., para. 
1). The proponent also must meet the notice requirements of Rule 902 (11).  Similar to (13), this 
establishes a procedure that allows parties to authenticate data copied from an electronic device, 
storage medium, or an electronic file without having to produce testimony from a foundation 
witness (Rule 902. Evidence that is Self-Authenticating, n.d.). This data can be authenticated by 
what is called the “hash value.”   
Hash Value is a unique number that contains: “a series of letters and numbers, what some 
courts have called a ‘digital fingerprint’ assigned to a particular input” (Martin, 2018, p. 3).  
Because a hash value is a unique identifier produced by an algorithm, any change in a file will 
change the hash value.  An unedited copy of a file will have the same hash value as the original.  
If a copy has a different hash value, then that copy will not be an exact replica.  Rule 902(14) 
allows for self-authentication from certification of a qualified person that they checked the hash 
value of the proffered item and that it is identical to the original (Rule 902. Evidence that is Self-
Authenticating, n.d.). Dennis Martin’s (2018) Demystifying Hash Searches describes a “hash 
search” as: “a very accurate, very computationally efficient type of search that can be used not 
just for legitimate purposes but also to identify evidence of crimes outside the scope of a search 
warrant” (p. 2).  He further breaks down the terms “hash function” and “hash set.”  A hash 
function is described as “a mathematical process that takes some input, like a text file or an 
image, and outputs a hash value” (p. 3).  A hash set is described as “a collection of inputs that are 
stored according to their hash values” (p. 3).  The use of hashing and hash values can be used to 
preserve evidence for trial.  For example, when a copy is made of a hard drive or surveillance 
video, each file generates a unique hash value.  Any minor change in that file will cause a 
significant difference in the hash value, therefore causing a digital chain of custody.  This way, 
the evidence presented at trial can be proven to be the same evidence seized initially.  The 
Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) identifies the following as the four most 
common hash algorithm families in current use: MD5, SHA1, SHA2, and SHA3 (Scientific Working 
Group on Digital Evidence, 2019). 
Hash values can help determine that a copy is the same as an original.  When dealing with 
digital evidence, the “original” is defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence 1001 (d), which states: 
the “ ’original’ means any printout—or other output readable by sight—if it accurately reflects 
the information.  An ‘original’ photograph includes the negative or a print from it” (Rule 1001. 
Definitions That Apply to This Article, n.d. para. 1).  Rule 1001 (e) defines a “duplicate” as “a 
counterpart produced by a mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent 
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process or technique that accurately reproduces the original” (Rule 1001, n.d. para. 1).  Rule 1003 
Admissibility of Duplicates (n.d.) further explains: “a duplicate is admissible to the same extent 
as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity or 
circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate” (para. 1).  In essence, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence is stating there is not a single “original” when it comes to digital evidence.  Anything 
that is an exact copy or replica of the original is then considered an original.  Therefore, by using 
hash values, a copy can be introduced and proven to be the same as the “original” in trial.  By 
producing a hash value when acquiring digital evidence, a member will be able to check any 
future copies against the original to maintain the integrity of the evidence. 
FRE 702, Testimony by Expert Witnesses (n.d.), may be necessary when handling digital 
evidence if a member collects, extracts, or analyzes the evidence.  FRE 702 states,  
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education may testify in the form of opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(b) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to facts of the case. (para. 
1) 
Authentication and the Supreme Court 
 The United States Supreme Court is the foremost authority in our legal system.  The 
Supreme Court has yet to decide any landmark cases dealing with the authentication of digital 
evidence; however, we can look at several past decisions to help guide us.  In Frye v. United States 
(1923), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals came up with what is now known as the Frye 
Test.  In their decision, the court noted that “the thing from which the deduction is made must 
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs” (Frye v. United States, 1923, para. 6).  In essence, the court said a “test” without an 
established place in science is between experimental and demonstrated science and therefore 
not “sufficiently established.”  So for a “process” or “test” to be admitted into evidence, it has to 
be “sufficiently established” and accepted within the scientific community (Frye Case Brief, n.d.). 
The Supreme Court articulated a similar threshold standard dealing with the admissibility of 
expert evidence in 1993 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc (1993).  Daubert is the 
standard by which a trial judge assesses whether an “expert witness’s scientific testimony is 
based on scientifically valid reasoning that which can properly be applied to the facts at issue” 
(Daubert, n.d., para.1).  The Supreme Court further identified the following factors to determine 
admissibility:  
(1) Whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested 
(2) Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication 
(3) Its known or potential error rate 
(4) The existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and 
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(5) Whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community 
(Daubert, n.d., para. 2) 
Authentication and Federal Appeals Court Cases    
 The state of Illinois falls under the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals jurisdiction, which means 
their decisions have mandatory authority over the state and any police department within it.  
Mandatory authority is any case, statute, or regulations the court must follow because it is 
binding on the court.  Therefore, lower courts must follow the decisions handed down by the 
higher courts.  Persuasive authority are any cases, statutes, regulations, or secondary sources 
that a court may elect to follow but is not mandated to do so (When and How to Use Secondary 
Sources and Persuasive Authority to Research and Write Legal Documents, 2004).  The 7th Circuit 
of Court of Appeals has yet to decide any cases dealing with video evidence; however other circuit 
Court of Appeals decisions can help give guidance through their persuasive authority.  The 
following are additional circuits Court of Appeals cases dealing with authentication and digital 
evidence: 
US v. Taylor (1976)  
A jury convicted Taylor and Hicks for Armed Robbery of a federally insured state bank.  
On the morning of February 10th, 1975, the Havana State Bank in Florida was robbed by two men 
wearing masks.  The robbers ordered everyone inside into a bank vault where they were locked 
inside.  As the robbers fled, a bank camera was tripped, which took pictures of the robbers.  Taylor 
and Hicks were stopped about an hour later in Georgia but were released after two bank tellers 
from the Havana State Bank could not identify them.  They were re-arrested the next day by the 
FBI due to the strength of the bank photographs taken at the time of the robbery.  Hicks argued 
in his appeal that the district court erred in admitting into evidence the contact prints made from 
the bank cameras.  Hicks argued the government did not lay the proper foundation for admission 
because none of the eyewitnesses could testify the prints accurately represented the inside of 
the bank when they were taken because they were locked in the vault.  The 8th circuit agreed 
with the notion the eyewitnesses would not be able to testify to the accuracy of the prints.  
However, the only testimony offered as to the foundation was the government witnesses who 
were not present at the time of the incident.  The government witnesses only testified to the 
“manner in which the film was installed in the camera, how the camera was activated, the fact 
that the film was removed immediately after the robbery, the chain of its possession, and the 
fact that it was properly developed and contact prints made from it.” The 5th Circuit found this 
testimony was enough for sufficient authentication for admission of the prints (US v. Taylor, 
1976). 
US v. Rembert (1988) 
In Rembert, the appellant Rembert was identified by eyewitnesses as well as a witness 
who made an identification after viewing a series of photographs from a closed-circuit 
surveillance video camera.  The photographs from the eyewitness identification were entered 
into evidence during the trial, with the sole authenticating witness being the supervisor of the 
loss-control division of a bank.  The supervisor testified how the cameras were set up, how they 
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recorded, how the cameras took a picture every three seconds, and how the process imprinted 
the date and time on each picture.  The supervisor testified that she did not have any personal 
knowledge of the events that took place but testified the photographs presented in court 
accurately depict what she viewed on the original videotape.  Rembert argued the photographs 
were admitted under two theories of authentication, illustrative or “pictorial testimony” and the 
“silent witness” model.  He further argued the foundation offered by the prosecution did not 
satisfy either of those two theories.  The court found that he was correct in claiming the 
foundation by the prosecution did not meet either of those two theories.  However, they 
followed the precedent set in an earlier ruling under United States v. Blackwell (1982) in that 
when dealing with photographic evidence, “authentication and identification are specialized 
aspects of relevancy that are necessary conditions precedent to admissibility” (para. 16). In 
Blackwell, photographs of the defendant holding a firearm were seized in a search warrant. The 
picture of the firearms was discovered in the same room as the recovered firearms.  No witnesses 
were able to testify to when, where, or by what process the photographs were made. 
Additionally, there were no witnesses to testify the photographs accurately and fairly 
depicted any particular scene on any specific date.  A detective who conducted the search 
warrant was able to testify to the detail of the pictured weapon. The detective also testified the 
interior background was similar to the details of the firearm and room in question.  The court 
required “only that the proponent of documentary evidence make a showing sufficient to permit 
a reasonable juror to find that the evidence is what its proponent claims” (para. 16).  The court 
also cited a previous case in the 9th Circuit, United States v. Stearns (1977) where Judge Kennedy 
wrote: “Even if direct testimony as to foundation matters is absent…the contents of a photograph 
itself, together with such other circumstantial or indirect evidence as bears upon the issue, may 
serve to explain and authenticate a photograph sufficiently to justify its admission into evidence” 
(paras. 12-21).  To be consistent with their decision in Blackwell and other sister circuit courts, 
the court stated: “we conclude that the contents of photographic evidence to be admitted into 
evidence need not be merely illustrative, but can be admitted as evidence independent of the 
testimony of any witness as to the events depicted, upon a foundation sufficient to meet the 
requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a)” (US v. Rembert, 1988, para. 14).  The court also 
noted “the role of photography in technology and society at large is a changing one, and the 
courts must change with it” (US v. Rembert, 1988, para. 16).  The court ruled the District Court 
judgment was without error in ruling the evidence was correctly admitted and affirmed (US v. 
Rembert, 1988). 
US v. Munoz (2003) 
In another 8th Circuit case, part of Rodriguez argues a videotape recording of his post-
Miranda statements was wrongly admitted into evidence by the district court.  Munoz and 
Rodriguez were arrested after a narcotic investigation in South Dakota.  After being advised of 
his Miranda Rights, Rodriguez consented to an interview when he admitted to selling and 
purchasing methamphetamine.  An edited version of this videotape confession was shown at the 
trial.  Rodriguez argued the videotape confession should not have been admitted into evidence 
due to the poor quality.  The 8th Circuit first noted the seven foundational requirements discussed 
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in McMillan (1974) were satisfied to allow the tape into evidence.  In McMillan (1974), the court 
provided seven requirements for introducing evidence obtained through electronic monitoring: 
1) That the recording device was capable of taping the conversation now offered 
in evidence. 
2) That the operator of the device was competent to operate the device 
3) That the recording is authentic and correct 
4) That changes, addition, or deletions have not been made in the recording 
5) That the recording has been preserved in a manner that is shown to the court 
6) That the speakers are identified 
7) That the conversation elicited was made voluntarily and in good faith, without 
any kind of inducement (para. 8) 
These requirements having been satisfied, the court ruled, “the quality of the recording did not 
call into question its trustworthiness, and because the evidence indicates that the recording was 
audible and intelligible, we conclude that the district court did not abuse in admitting it into 
evidence” (US v. Munoz, 2003, para. 14). 
The following Federal Appeals court cases concern issues with hash values and functions.  
They provide guidance on the importance and reliability of hash values. 
US v. Glassgow (2012) 
Robert Glassgow was convicted of receipt of child pornography after the seizure of his 
computer, which contained 88 images of child pornography on his hard drive.  Glassgow admitted 
to investigators that he viewed the images, which he accessed through a peer-to-peer program 
called “Frostwire.”  After the images were downloaded, they were modified, accessed, and then 
attempted to be deleted but remained on unallocated space on his hard drive.  Glassgow argued 
the government’s exhibit 1, a DVD compilation of three video clips from a law enforcement 
database, were only “similar” to the images found on his computer.  The government’s witness 
testified the SHA1 values of the law enforcement videos matched the SHA1 values of the files on 
Glassgow’s computer.  According to the government witness, the SHA1 values matching meant 
there was a 99.9999% probability that Exhibit 1 contained the same video clips found on 
Glassgow’s computer.  The court also defined SHA-1 as “stands for Secure Hash Algorithm Version 
2- a digital fingerprint of a computer file.  It is a 32-digit number that is calculated for a file and 
unique to it” (para. 4).  The Eighth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting their video exhibits.  This case is also an excellent example of why Rule 902 (13) and 
(14) were enacted.  This case was settled in 2012, before 902 (13) and (14).  However, in this 
case, the prosecution could have produced a certified document showing the SHA1 values for 
Glassgow’s files compared to the SHA1 values of the law enforcement database files.  This 
certified document may have alleviated the need to bring in the government witness to testify 
to the match (US v. Glassgow, 2012).   
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US v. Miknevich (2011) 
Miknevich argued in this case that the warrant issued for his home did not have sufficient 
probable cause from the affidavit prepared by law enforcement.  Investigators with the Delaware 
State Police were investigating child pornography using P2P file-sharing networks.  During the 
investigation, a file known to law enforcement to be child pornography was discovered along 
with its SHA1 hash value.  From experience, investigators knew this hash value to be child 
pornography.  The network used by investigators returned a list of users and their IP addresses 
who had this same file or a portion of it.  One of those IP addresses belonged to Miknevich.  Due 
to these facts, a warrant was obtained to seize Miknevich’s computer.  The court upheld the 
District Court’s order affirming the search warrant was valid in part due to the “significance of 
the SHA1 value as a ‘digital fingerprint’ and avers that the investigating officers were familiar with 
the SHA1 value associated with the file on Miknevich’s computer” (para. 21). Despite the court 
recognizing that computer file names do not always represent what is contained in the file, the 
court found that the descriptive file name and the SHA1 value had sufficient facts for probable 
cause (US v. Miknevich, 2011). 
US v. Wellman (2011) 
The Wellman case is another child pornography case where the validity of the search 
warrant was challenged.  Like Miknevich, West Virginia State Police investigators received a 
spreadsheet from another local law enforcement agency that identified instances where child 
pornography was transmitted over a computer file-sharing network.  Although the files were not 
identified by name, type, or description, as was the case in Miknevich, their hash value identified 
them.  The investigators received a spreadsheet that “contained a hash value for a digital file, the 
Internet Protocol (IP) address of the computer offering the file for download, the locality in which 
that computer operated, the time and date the file was observed, and the officer from the Task 
Force who identified the file, as well as his or her law enforcement agency” (para. 2).  Further 
investigation revealed one IP address belonging to Wellman alleged to have hosted five different 
digital files of suspected child pornography.  The court ruled that the district court did not err in 
denying Wellman’s motion to suppress because of the totality of the information provided in the 
search warrant.  The affiant in the search warrant provided his background as an investigator, 
which established his experience in child pornography cases.  A thorough explanation of the 
technology used in the investigation and the additional effort that resulted in a six-week 
investigation provided enough probable cause for the search warrant (US v. Wellman, 2011). 
 The following case deals with chain of custody issues that can provide guidance on the 
importance of handling evidence and chain of custody. 
Gallego v. United States (1960) 
Gallego was a case decided in the 9th Circuit where the court looked at the issue of chain 
of custody with evidence.  Gallego was stopped crossing the border into the US from Mexico by 
an immigration inspector and a customs inspector.  The immigration inspector discovered a paper 
sack containing marijuana in the trunk of Gallego’s vehicle, who then handed the sack to the 
customs inspector.  The customs inspector then immediately gave the paper sack to Fred 
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Valenzuela, the Deputy Collector of Customs, who took the sack to his office and placed it in his 
desk at the Customs House.  Immediately afterward, Gallego was searched at the Customs house 
where a tobacco can containing marijuana cigarettes was discovered on his person, which was 
also placed in Valenzuela’s desk.  Both items were in the desk for about an hour, with Valenzuela 
in the vicinity the entire time.  Valenzuela then put the items in a safe for the night. 
The next day, Valenzuela retrieved the two items, brought them to a hearing, and 
returned them to the safe after the hearing.  Ten days later, the items were removed from the 
safe and sent by registered mail to a customs laboratory in Los Angeles.  After testing, they were 
then returned by registered mail and put back in the safe, where they were kept until the day of 
the trial.  At trial, the immigration inspector identified the paper sack and its contents with his 
initials and testified that it was the same one he had discovered in Gallego’s vehicle.  He was 
handed the can with his initials on it and testified it appeared to be the same can that was found 
but was unable to testify the contents were the same.  Valenzuela also examined both items and 
testified the sack as the same one turned over to him and the can as the same one he discovered 
on the appellant’s person.  He further testified the contents of the can appeared to be “very 
much” the same as when he discovered the can.  The chemist who analyzed the two containers 
testified they were the same ones that reached him by registered mail that, by his analysis, both 
containers tested for marijuana.  The safe where the contents were kept had a combination 
where the only two individuals with the combination were Valenzuela and the acting deputy 
collector of customs, who took the place of Valenzuela when he was away.  Gallego challenged 
the admissibility of the evidence for failing to show the government had exclusive control and 
possession of the articles during the ten days they were in the safe.  Gallego further argued that 
it was incumbent on the government to prove that the chain of custody was complete and the 
items were not tampered with or altered during the ten-day period.  The 9th Circuit stated that a 
physical object connected with the commission of a crime must be shown to be in “substantially 
the same condition as when the crime was committed” to be admitted into evidence.  The only 
person allowed to make this determination is the trial judge.  The jury is then allowed to disregard 
the evidence if the article was not correctly identified or change in its nature.  The court 
determined the following factors to be considered by the judge: “the nature of the article, the 
circumstances surrounding the preservation and custody of it, and the likelihood of 
intermeddlers tampering with it.  If upon the consideration of such factors the trial judge is 
satisfied that in reasonable probability the article has not been changed in important aspects, he 
may permit its introduction into evidence.”  The court further noted the jury is then free to 
disregard evidence if it finds the evidence was not adequately identified or a change in its nature.  
The court also cited Pasadena Research Laboratories v. United States (1948), absence of evidence 
to the contrary, “the presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers, and 
courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties” (para. Presumption of 
Regularity).  They further state: “there is no rule requiring the prosecution to produce as 
witnesses all person who were in a position to come into contact with the article sought to be 
introduced in evidence” (para. 15). The court ruled the trial court did not err in allowing the two 




Authentication and State Cases 
In the state system, the rules of evidence are guided by each states’ rules of evidence 
statutes.  For example, in Illinois, the rules of evidence are guided by the Illinois Rules of Evidence.  
Most states model their rules of evidence after the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE).  In Illinois, 
authentication and identification are covered in Article IX of the rules of evidence.  Like the FRE, 
Rule 901 is the Requirement of Authentication or Identification and Rule 902 covers Self-
Authentication (Illinois Rules of Evidence, n.d.).  In Illinois, Rule 902 (12) Certified Records 
Generated by an Electronic Process or System and (13) Certified Data Copied from an Electronic 
Device, Storage Medium, or File are similar to FRE Rule 902 (13) and (14) (Illinois Rules of 
Evidence, n.d.). Just as we can look at Supreme Court and Federal Court of Appeals decisions to 
provide us guidance, we can also look to the state court system to provide guidance on dealing 
with authentication.  In Illinois, People v. Taylor (2011) is the standard regarding video evidence.  
Illinois and the People v. Taylor  
In the state of Illinois, the Illinois Supreme Court provided guidance on admitting video 
evidence in People v. Taylor (2011).  In case a hidden motion-activated surveillance camera 
caught a night watchman stealing from a desk in a locked office.  The camera was set up by a 
detective, who then copied footage from the hard drive of the digital video recorder (DVR) to a 
VHS tape.  The night watchman was identified by several co-workers and subsequently 
prosecuted for theft after admitting to stealing money in a police interview.  During the trial, the 
detective testified to setting up the camera and making sure it was in proper working order.  He 
also testified that he tested the equipment after the incident and found it to still be in proper 
working order.  The detective further explained the motion activation feature of the camera and 
how the motion produced two video clips, one being twelve seconds and the other being eight 
seconds.  The detective testified the thirty-second gap between the two recordings was due to 
the settings on the camera system that stops recording when it no longer senses motion.  It was 
further explained the first video clip was of the defendant entering the office and squatting in 
front of the desk.  The camera’s motion sensors did not pick up any motion while the defendant 
was squatting down in front of the desk.  The second clip caught the defendant standing back up 
and exiting the room. 
After being found guilty of misdemeanor theft by the trial court, the defendant filed a 
motion to reconsider a new trial on the basis the State had failed to lay a proper foundation for 
the admission of the VHS tape.  After citing People v. Vaden (2003), where “the appellate court 
noted that under the ‘silent witness’ theory, photographic or videotape evidence may be 
admitted without an eyewitness to establish the accuracy of the images depicted if there is 
sufficient proof of the reliability of the process that produced the photograph or videotape,” the 
appellate court reversed and remanded.  The Court ruled the State failed to lay a proper 
foundation for admission of the VHS tape because it was unable to establish reliability of the 
process that produced the tape.  The State also failed to show proper chain of custody; the 
camera was working correctly, the original DVR recording was preserved, and it was unable to 
explain the process of copying the recording from the DVR to VHS tape.  The Supreme Court 
reversed under the grounds the appellate court’s reasoning was overly restrictive.  The Illinois 
Supreme Court held the State did, in fact, lay a proper foundation for admission of the tape.  The 
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Supreme Court noted most jurisdictions allow photographic and video evidence to be introduced 
as substantive evidence under the “silent witness” theory.  Each case will present varying 
circumstances and foundation requirements for guaranteeing the genuineness of the evidence 
(People v. Taylor, 2011). 
If we look closer at the decision by the Illinois Supreme Court, in this case, the court 
provided a lot of guidance for digital evidence.  In providing analysis on the standard of review 
dispute, the court offered several cases that help understand how the court views video 
evidence.  In Cisarik v. Palos Community Hospital (1991), the court pointed out videotapes were 
admissible on the same basis as photographs. In People v. Smith (1992), the court found that the 
admission of photographs was at the trial court's discretion.  In People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns 
(2003), the court noted that videotapes could be admitted into evidence when properly 
authenticated and expressly stated: “the admission of a videotape into evidence is within the 
sound discretion of the circuit court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.  
Addressing chain of custody in People v. Woods (2005), the court noted: “chain of custody is used 
to lay a proper foundation for the admission of evidence…and a challenge to the chain of custody 
is an evidentiary issue.”   
In reviewing the admissibility of videotape, the court provided a definition for the “silent 
witness” theory.  When the photographs and videotapes are introduced as substantive evidence 
under the “silent witness” theory, they do so after a proper foundation has been laid out.  A 
witness does not need to necessarily testify to the accuracy of a photograph or video footage as 
long as the accuracy of the process that produced that material is established with the proper 
foundation.  In People v. Taylor (2011), the court admitted that they had not yet addressed 
foundational issues for establishing the accuracy of a process that produces surveillance camera 
recording evidence.  They further note that other jurisdictions have set forth various relevant 
factors to consider.  For example, in State v. Harris (2001), the court noted three factors for laying 
a foundation of authentication of photos taken by automated camera: “(1) system was reliable, 
(2) system was in working order when the photo was taken, and (3) film was handled and 
safeguarded properly from time it was removed from the camera until time of trial.”  In 
Washington v. State (2008) the court found surveillance footage and photographs produced from 
surveillance equipment which was automatically operated admissible when “a witness testifies 
to the type of equipment or camera used, its general reliability, the quality of the recorded 
product, the process by which it was focused, or the general reliability of the entire system.”   
The court understood the circumstances of each case, and the “requirements to 
guarantee the genuineness of the evidence will always differ” (People v. Taylor, 2011, para. 34).  
So even though the courts may set forth various factors in assessing the process that produces 
surveillance footage, those factors are not necessarily exclusive foundation requirements.  The 
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appellate court in People v. Taylor (2011) looked at 
several factors in determining whether a proper 
foundation had been laid:  
1) the device’s capability for recording and 
general reliability  
2) competency of the operator 
3) proper operation of the device 
4) showing the manner in which the 
recording was preserved (chain of custody) 
5) identification of the persons, locale, or 
objects depicted 
6) explanation of any copying or duplication 
process (para. 35)  
The court agreed with the appellate court’s 
factors, however as they noted with other jurisdictions, 
they emphasized that the list of factors was 
nonexclusive.  They wanted each case evaluated on its 
own, depending on the facts of the case.  In some cases, 
some of those factors may not be relevant; in other 
cases, there may be a need to consider more factors 
(People v. Taylor, 2011). 
State v. Sassarini (2019) - Oregon 
 This case involved a confrontation between 
neighbors that resulted in one neighbor recording part 
of the confrontation with a video camera.  The neighbor 
then provided the police with a copy of the 
confrontation on a DVD which contained three files the 
day after the incident.  The files would not play at the 
police station, so the neighbor provided another copy 
four days later.  Sassarini filed a motion to exclude the 
evidence because it could not be authenticity of the 
chain of custody.  During a hearing for an in limine 
motion, the neighbor identified the camera and the DVD 
that was booked into evidence.  After the DVD was 
played in court, Sassarini argued the video she received 
in discovery was not the same video as the one played 
in court.  The court discovered Sassarini’s copy included 
the in-car camera footage that the police department 
had added to provide one single DVD containing all the 
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video footage.  The neighbor further testified that the video footage played in court was the same 
footage as the original recordings on his camera.  The neighbor further testified he had initially 
brought the camera’s memory card to a third party to produce the copy for the police but did not 
alter the footage in any way.  The police officer who responded to the scene and took custody of 
the DVD testified the video played in court was the same video that he observed at the neighbor’s 
home.  The officer also was unable to testify to what happened to the recordings between the 
time he watched the footage and the time he took custody of the DVD.  The court ruled the state 
had presented a sufficient showing of authenticity and sent the footage to the jury.  The Oregon 
Court of Appeals concluded the trial court correctly admitted the video into evidence under OEC 
901 with sufficient evidence to authenticate the video.  
 Washington v. State (2008) - Maryland 
Washington got into a verbal argument with another patron at a bar.  After leaving the 
bar and returning, Washington asked the victim to step outside.  Upon stepping outside, the 
victim was immediately shot, resulting in a spinal injury.  Washington was subsequently arrested.  
At trial, the State introduced a videotape recording of the bar’s surveillance cameras from inside 
and outside the bar.  The bar owner testified to the number and placement of cameras and the 
operational setup of the camera.  After the police requested to see the video, the owner testified 
he had a technician make a copy for the police.  The officer investigating the case testified at trial 
as to what he observed in the video.  Two other witnesses who were in the bar testified to the 
events they observed in the bar.  The State did not call the technician who made the copy of the 
video from the system.  The Court of Appeals ruled the video was inadmissible because the State 
failed to lay an adequate foundation as to the process that produced the copy of the video.  The 
court further stated:  
Because of the lack of extrinsic evidence showing under what circumstances the 
surveillance footage was transferred to a compact disc, the trier of fact could not 
reasonably infer the subject matter is what the State claims it to be and, thus, the 
videotape was not sufficiently authenticated. (Washington v. State, 2008, para. 
19)  
The State failed to authenticate the video because it was derived from an eight-camera system, 
was created by an unknown person, and from an unknown process without any testimony to 
how that occurred or to any chain of custody.  This Court of Appeals remanded the case back to 
trial court for a new trial. 
State v. Nieves (2013) – New Jersey 
 A resident called 9-1-1 after hearing gunshots and observing an individual lying on the 
ground.  An officer from the Prosecutor’s Office Crime Scene Technical Services Unit met the 
resident, reviewed the surveillance system, and copied footage to a disc of two people walking.  
The video shows light flashes from the shooting, and then a subject walk away.  Detectives then 
meet with an owner of a bar where the bar’s four exterior cameras were working.  A detective 
viewed the footage taken during the time of the incident that the bar owner provided.  The 
Detective was not aware of how the footage was extracted from the system, who extracted it, or 
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if any changes were made to it.  A third set of recordings were recovered from another bar in the 
area.  The video showed the victim and defendant talking inside the bar at an unknown 
date/time.  The State’s expert then created a composite video utilizing the three sources of video 
that had been recovered.  The composite video was shown to the Grand Jury, which ended up 
indicting Nieves.  The Defense expert argued the videos could not be authenticated because of 
the lack of the originals and lack of time stamps on the video.  The judge granted the defense 
motion to bar admission of the tapes because they lacked probative value and didn’t meet the 
fundamental requirements of admissibility under NJRE 901.  The Appellate Division of The 
Superior Court agreed with the trial judge because the composite video was created from copies 
from several cameras that were not correctly time-stamped.  Authentication would be impossible 
without an accurate timeline, without specifically eliciting a chain of custody because the 
originals were not taken, and without reliable identification as to “time, place, date, individuals 
and activities.” 
 Commonwealth v. Connolly (2017) - Massachusetts 
 Connolly was arrested for assault and battery stemming from an altercation in an 
apartment building hallway.  Connolly didn’t deny the confrontation but argued it was self-
defense.  The State only produced one witness, a police officer who viewed surveillance footage 
of the incident that was recorded from inside the building.  Unfortunately, the video was 
accidentally deleted before the defense had an opportunity to view the footage.  The defense 
objected to the officer's testimony about the footage, but it was allowed at trial by the judge.  
The Appeals court found the State did not lay a proper foundation for authentication because it 
did not present evidence to show the video's date, time, or location.  Further, the State did not 
call in the building manager to testify to the nature of the camera system, such as the placement 
of the cameras, the type of equipment, or how he came to view the footage.  Therefore, the State 
did not establish a sufficient foundation for the jury to determine the video was what the officer 
claimed it to be.   The Court found the Commonwealth would have to establish authenticity of 
the video with testimony from another individual in any retrial. 
Law Reviews 
Just as we look to the courts to provide guidance on how to deal with authenticating 
digital evidence in the everchanging world of technology, the discussions and ideas put forth in 
law reviews can also provide guidance.  In Law of the Foal: Careful Steps Towards Digital 
Competence in Proposed Rules 902(13) and 902(14), Facciola and Barrett (2016) discuss the 
difficulty the courts have in applying the Federal Rules of Evidence in modern times.  The Federal 
Rules of Evidence was established to provide guidance on every evidentiary problem that may 
arise during a trial.  However, they were initially established to deal with physical evidence such 
as DNA and fingerprints.  902(13) and 902(14) were established to help the courts deal with the 
virtual world of digital evidence.  The Committee purposefully made 902(13) narrow to allow 
authentication of electronically stored information to avoid having to call in a witness.  The 
committee provides an example of a photograph introduced in trial.  Instead of calling in a 
witness to testify to taking the picture, the phone software captures metadata of things like the 
date, time, and GPS coordinates.  This information is automatically generated due to a system 
that produces the same results every time.  A party would only need to produce certification on 
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how the electronically stored information was created, transmitted, or stored to establish 
authenticity.  In 902(14), the Committee made the rule on the premise that every piece of 
electronically stored information has a unique “hash value.”  The “hash value” is a unique and 
random identifier that is compared to a digital fingerprint.  Checking “hash values” allows for 
authentication of copies of evidence to the original to prove the evidence is what the proponent 
says it is.  However, Facciola and Barret are concerned that courts may not further adjust rules 
to keep up with technology.  They worry that the courts will accept certification and move on 
without challenging the process that produced the certification.  For example, a breathalyzer 
produces a report that can be authenticated.  However, the question of whether that process 
worked correctly or produced an accurate result should evaluated (Facciola & Barret, 2016). 
In their article, Authenticating Digital Evidence, Grimm et al. (2017) discuss how the new 
amendments 902(13) and 903(14) will change the way the courts authenticate digital evidence.  
They begin by emphasizing that authenticating digital evidence is the “same mild standard” as 
traditional forms of evidence.  Before understanding digital evidence authentication, they first 
discuss FRE 104(a), which states: “the court must decide any preliminary question about whether 
a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not 
bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege” (p. 5).  In essence, for most decisions about 
the admissibility of evidence, either digital or not, the decision must be made by the judge alone.  
The judge will be the sole decision-maker if the evidence is relevant, constitutes hearsay, is 
excessively prejudicial compared to probative value, the qualification of experts, and the extent 
of their opinion testimony, etc.  The judge decides what evidence the jury may hear, and then it 
is up to the jury to weigh the evidence as they see fit.  FRE Rule 104(b) qualifies 104(a) by 
providing the court with guidance on when the relevance of evidence depends on when a fact 
exists that must be proved later (Grimm et al., 2017).  With the new self-authentication rules in 
902(13) and 902(14), the burden of authenticity questions shifts to the opponent of the evidence.  
The opponent is still afforded the opportunity to challenge the certificate of authenticity, not the 
burden of proof.  902(13) and 902(14) provides the proponent of the evidence a more 
straightforward method to authenticate without reducing the standards for authentication.   A 
certification under 902(13) and 902(14) establishes only that the proffered item has satisfied the 
admissibility requirements for authenticity (Grimm et al., 2017). 
In recent times, some of the digital evidence being introduced at trial comes from police 
body-worn cameras (BWC’s) and private citizen footage from cell phones.  One of the challenges 
arising in today’s climate is how do we authenticate digital evidence from these sources.  In 
Democratizing Proof: Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera Videos, Fan (2018) discusses the 
importance of pooling public and police videos in an effort to solve crime.  One of the issues with 
this concept is that only police videos are currently uploaded securely to the cloud, ensuring 
video integrity, chain of custody, and inclusion into the official record.  On the other hand, public 
videos are often uploaded on the internet to places like YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, and other 
social media outlets.  According to Fan, this presents challenges in authentication.  Fan identifies 
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the following relevant factors from McEntyre v. State 
and United States v. Munoz which help in determining 
authentication of videos:  
1) there have been no changes, additions, 
or deletions to the recording 
2) the recording was preserved in a way 
that ensures its own integrity 
3) the recording is correct and authentic 
4) the device used to record was capable of 
capturing the relevant events 
5) the person who recorded was competent 
to do so 
6) the recording was made in good faith 
7) participants on the recording are 
identified (Fan, 2018, p. 6) 
Also discussing the importance of body 
camera footage, Pike (2018) argues in her article, 
When Discretion to Record Becomes Assertive: Body 
Camera Footage as Hearsay, that evidence deriving 
from officer’s body-worn camera should be evaluated 
differently from ordinary digital evidence due to the 
human element associated with body-worn cameras.  
Pike argues that even computers and forensic 
machines should be subject to more rigorous 
admissibility standards due to human coding and thus 
have a human element attached to them.  She also 
believes there is a case for heightened standards for 
police body-worn cameras.  She writes: “courts have 
repeatedly held that cameras- both manually and 
automatic- may be authenticated as a silent witness, 
body cameras represent a unique challenge to 
authentication that is distinguishable from cameras 
of the past” (Pike, 2018, p. 5).  Body cameras are 
controlled by the officer, therefore relaying on direct 
human manipulation to work.  They are also meant to 
provide an “officer perspective” of the incident.  
Security cameras result from computer coding that 
results in the camera either constantly recording or 
being activated by a specific automated process such 
Fan identifies the following 
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as motion.  Body-worn cameras are triggered by a human response to human-recognized 
triggering events.  Pike argues that body camera footage should then be viewed as hearsay 
evidence instead of demonstrative evidence (Pike, 2018). The above-listed articles identify that 
not all video evidence in the trial will come from surveillance cameras.  Trials may have video 
evidence from surveillance cameras, body-worn cameras, or cell phone videos uploaded to social 
media.  As the courts have attempted to keep up with technology with rules like 902 (13) and 
(14), the courts will have to continually monitor and evaluate technology and advances in video 
to ensure the rules of evidence stay relevant.  
Best Practices 
 After utilizing the court decisions at the federal and state level and law reviews discussing 
current issues in digital evidence authentication, the experts can provide guidance in procedures 
and policy to help law enforcement stay up to date.  The National Institute of Justice provides 
guidance for law enforcement when dealing with authentication of digital evidence in their 
report, Digital Evidence in the Courtroom: A Guide for Law Enforcement and Prosecutors 
(National Institute of Justice, 2007). The NIJ advises that key issues when dealing with 
authentication deal with showing that the evidence has not undergone significant changes.  This 
can be done by providing chain of custody or through a witness with knowledge testimony to 
show the evidence is what it claims to be.  The witness with knowledge who will testify must have 
personal knowledge of the facts they will testify to, but the witness “need not have been the 
programmer of the computer in question, have knowledge of its maintenance and technical 
operation, or have seen the data entered” (National Institute of Justice, 2007, p. 30).  The NIJ 
provides an example of a computer seized from a defendant.  The evidence could be 
authenticated by the investigating officer that seized the computer, who would show the 
computer was in the defendant’s possession and the examiner who recovered the files to show 
they were found on the same computer (National Institute of Justice, 2007). 
 In 2015, the NIJ put out another report titled: Digital Evidence and the U.S. Criminal Justice 
System, Identifying Technology and Other Needs to More Effectively Acquire and Utilize Digital 
Evidence by Goodison et al.  This report looks at current trends in digital evidence recovery, legal 
issues, research, case discussion, and recommendations that help law enforcement navigate 
working with digital evidence.  In October of 2016, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), in a 
collaborative effort with the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, issued a report, Video 
Evidence: A Primer for Prosecutors, acknowledged the change in video evidence in the court 
room over the last ten years.  The report identified challenges using video evidence in 
prosecutions, the video-evidence process, and preparation tips for trial (Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiative, 2016).   
 The Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) consists of members approved 
and voted in from all across law enforcement, the legal community, private industry, and 
academia.  Members are involved in the digital and multimedia forensic profession and makeup 
six committees that develop guidance documents and three administrative committees.  The 
SWGDE releases documents that provide guidance, best practices, recommendations, and tech 
notes.  Some of the documents produced by the SWGDE that may be beneficial to law 
enforcement in digital evidence include: 
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-Training Guidelines for Video Analysis, Image Analysis, and Photography 
-Best Practices for Data Acquisition from Digital Video Recorders 
-Best Practices for Digital & Multimedia Evidence Video Acquisition from Cloud Storage 
-Best Practices for Archiving Digital and Multimedia Evidence 
-Best Practices for Digital Forensic Video Analysis 
-Guidelines & Recommendations for Training in Digital & Multimedia Evidence 
-Best Practices for Maintaining the Integrity of Imagery 
 By keeping updated on the most recent court decisions, legal opinions, and industry 
standards, law enforcement can attempt to minimize future legal challenges to their 
investigations.  The above listed material provides law enforcement agencies guidance in how to 







To evaluate how various departments across the country follow best practice in the field 
of digital multimedia evidence (DME), the author created an evaluation rubric from multiple 
sources such as the organization Law Enforcement and Emergency Services Video Association 
International (LEVA) and the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE).  The author 
also used best practices from other groups such as the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Bureau 
of Justice Administration (BJA), and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).  The author also 
relied on his professional experience working with digital evidence in his capacity as a Detective 
in a large urban police department located in the Midwest.  The author is currently assigned to a 
technology unit tasked with provided technology support primarily in homicide investigations 
and shootings, robberies, burglaries, etc.  Although the author is responsible for performing many 
job functions while assigned to the unit, the main emphasis is on collecting, extracting, and 
analyzing DME.  In his current position, the author has received some of the training listed in the 
rubric and performs many of the functions and tasks listed in the rubric.  Although this rubric may 
not address every possible best practice suggested by professional organizations, the author 
believes it covers most of them by using the premier organizations and authorities in digital 
evidence as guidance. 
The primary source for the rubric came from LEVA and SWGDE because they are 
considered the preeminent authorities on digital evidence.  LEVA was founded in 1989 and 
“serves as a key resource to the global public safety community by focusing on the needs of digital 
multimedia evidence disciplines by providing opportunities for professional development 
through quality training and informational exchange” (Law Enforcement & Emergency Services 
Video Association, n.d.). LEVA members come from all over the world and include international, 
federal, state, and local law enforcement, public safety, prosecutors’ offices, and private analysis.  
LEVA training consists of lecture and hands-on practical exercises that allow students to work 
with equipment and tools that are widely used in the field (Law Enforcement & Emergency 
Services Video Association, n.d.).  LEVA also provides training that exposes students to the theory 
and principles considered best practices in Digital Multimedia Evidence (DME).  A student who 
has completed and passed LEVA’s level 1 and 2 training courses can become a Certified Forensic 
Video Technician CFVT).  Students who have completed and passed LEVA’s levels 1 through 4 
training can become Certified Forensic Video Analysts (CFVA).  Both a CFVT and CFVA require 
specialized training, but there are differences in handling digital evidence.  Generally, a person 
who employs a Technical Function in processing DME, such as a CFVT, will follow a step-by-step 
process or procedure.  A few examples of Technical Functions are: 
• copy digital media 
• convert digital media from one format to another 
• print images from digital media 
• archive data 
• output data to an analog or digital medium 




• perform basic image adjustments 
• time reference adjustments/calibrations (Law Enforcement and Emergency 
Services Video Association, UNK, p. 5) 
Someone who performs Analytical Functions similar to the CFVA will require additional 
skills, education, experience, and training.  This training allows them to exhibit a significant 
amount of judgment or opinion based on the product they produced from specific processes.  A 
person who performs Analytical Functions can perform the tasks listed in Technical Functions but 
can also include: 
• image Comparison or Photographic/Video Comparison such as comparing and 
contrasting known objects or persons to questioned objects or persons 
• conduct image aspect ratio calibration 
• color correction  
• reverse projection 
• photogrammetry 
• motion tracking 
• image stabilization 
• media alignment 
• audio/video alignment (Law Enforcement and Emergency Services Video 
Association, UNK, p. 5) 
SWGDE also describes different job categories of responding personnel who may come 
across DME.  Each job category may have a different name or responsibility from organization to 
organization depending on how they are defined and their involvement in handling digital 
evidence.  However, SGWEDE identifies that these job categories often overlap. Training 
programs should be designed specifically for the tasks to be performed but may contain several 
job categories.  The SWGDE job categories are: 
• First Responder: Includes personnel who are the first to secure, preserve, and/or 
collect video, image, and phot0graphic evidence at a crime scene.  These 
personnel often have general crime scene evidence collection responsibilities.  
• Field Photographer/Videographer: includes personnel who document and 
preserve conditions and evidence through photography or videography outside 
the laboratory. 
• Technician: includes personnel whose primary responsibility is to collect and/or 
prepare video, image, and photographic evidence for examination and analysis. 
• Laboratory Photographer: includes personnel whose primary responsibility is to 
document and preserve evidence through photography within the laboratory 
• Examiner/Analyst: includes personnel for whom examination, analysis, and/or 
recovery of video, image, and photographic evidence is a major component of 
their routine duties. (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016, p. 6) 
For this study, the author has chosen to analyze and evaluate police departments on their 
best practices under the job categories and duties of the First Responder and Technician.  
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Although departments may have separate job titles or defined roles for recovering DME, one 
specific job title will often be responsible for other tasks that do not fall under their primary 
responsibility.  For example, a technician may be the First Responder while conducting their 
duties and, therefore, must have a basic understanding of the primary responsibilities of the First 
Responder.  Vice versa, a First Responder, may find themselves being tasked to perform 
Technician duties due to circumstances outside their control.  Well-written policy and procedure 
that provides officers with a proper, easy to follow guideline to follow best practices identified in 
the policy.  The author chose to evaluate under the scope of these two categories because they 
most envelop the job description and duties the author encounters in his current position and, 
therefore, know those categories.  The author also feels well-defined standard operating 
procedures can be the most useful to these two positions. They cover the broadest and general 
job descriptions of handling digital multimedia evidence. 
LEVA follows guidelines and best practices identified and provided by the Scientific 
Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE).  On its website, SWGDE identifies itself as "bringing 
together organizations actively engaged in the field of digital multimedia evidence to foster 
communication and cooperation as well as to ensure quality and consistency within the forensic 
community” (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, n.d.).  SWGDE consists of six main 
committees “that develop guidance documents on the sub-disciplines within digital evidence.”  
These six committees are the Audio Committee, Forensic Committee, Imaging Committee, 
Photography Committee, Quality Standards Committee, and the Video Committee.  SWGDE’s 
member organizations are a combination of public and private organizations such as various 
federal, state, and local law enforcement, prosecutor’s offices, private tech firms, and even retail 
stores.  SWGDE’s members compose of individuals who have been approved and voted in from 
all levels of government, the legal community, private industry, and academia involved in the 
digital and multimedia forensic profession (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, n.d.).  
In their bylaws, SWGDE states their purpose as: “to support and promote the advancement of 
the application of digital and multimedia forensics through the development and dissemination 
of consensus-based standards, guidelines, best practices, and recommendations.  The Scientific 
Working Group on Digital Evidence brings together organizations actively engaged in the field of 
digital and multimedia evidence to foster communication and cooperation as well as to ensure 
quality and consistency in the forensic community” (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 
n.d.).  SWGDE’s objectives state they shall at a minimum: 
• Define the scope and practice areas of the discipline of digital and multimedia evidence 
• Recommend standard practices, protocols, reports, and terminology 
• Recommend standards for data interpretation and wording of conclusions 
• Recommend education, training, and continuing education requirements 
• Promulgate and disseminate research and development priorities to the community 
• Collect and distribute discipline-specific information on scientific foundation 
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• Seek international recognition and harmonization of appropriate SWGDE work products 
(Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, n.d.) 
Along with the recommendations and best practices provided by LEVA and SWGDE, the 
author also chose to utilize best practices by agencies such as the Bureau of Justice Assistance 
(BJA), National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).  These 
reports consist of knowledge and input from law enforcement professionals from the federal, 
state, and local levels and prosecutors and private sector employees similar to LEVA and SWGDE.  
Utilizing these various resources and rulings from the courts and discussions brought forth 
in the Law Reviews, the author has developed a rubric (See Appendix A) to evaluate how police 
departments follow current best practices when dealing with their digital evidence.  The main 
focus of the rubric will be concentrated on how the departments’ policies and procedures 
address the issue of authenticity of the evidence they handle.  The author would like to identify 
where these policies and procedures either follow best practice to mitigate future challenges to 
authenticity or are not following best practice thereby creating an opportunity for future 
challenges to the evidence.   
The author chose to evaluate police departments in three pivotal phases: Training, 
Methods, and Documentation.  The author will evaluate how these departments' Standard 
Operation Procedure's (SOPs) and policies address the best practices identified by LEVA, SWGDE, 
etc., concerning these three areas.  In looking at how departments prepare to handle digital 
evidence in the Preparation section, four key areas were identified: Outside Training, Internal 
Training, Continuing Education, and Equipment.  For police departments that want to ensure 
their members are following the most current and common procedures in the forensic 
community, SWGDE recommends they follow the following training recommendations: 
• Define and employ a quality assurance program for the implementation of a 
training program for the valid and reliable use of appropriate procedures. 
• Training should include only the use of validated technologies and methods.  
Training should include awareness of and/or methods used for validating 
technologies. 
• Commit to continuous learning in video, image, and photographic technologies 
and stay abreast of new findings, equipment, techniques, legal developments, and 
technological advances. 
• Implement a program for continual assessment of employees’ skills. 
• Pursue professional development certificates (Scientific Working Group on Digital 
Evidence, 2016, p. 5). 
SWGDE further identifies the different categories of training relevant to those individuals 
who deal with digital evidence or who supervise it as the following: 
• Awareness: Training designed to provide the student with a general knowledge of 
the major elements of digital and multimedia evidence (e.g., video analysis, 
forensic audio, image analysis and computer forensics), including the capabilities 
and limitations of hardware and software. 
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• Skills and Techniques: Training designed to provide the student with the ability to 
competently use specific tools and procedures. 
• Knowledge of Processes: Training designed to provide the student with an 
understanding of digital and multimedia evidence procedures and how to apply 
that understanding given various situations and sub-disciplines. 
• Skills Development for Legal Proceedings:  
▪ Witness Testimony: Training designed to provide the student with the 
ability to present clear and non-technical digital and multimedia evidence-
based testimony in court. 
▪ Forensic Results Preparation: Training designed to provide the student 
with the ability to prepare accurate and reliable documentation and/or 
visual aids (e.g., notes, reports, printouts, audio recordings). 
• Continuing Education: Training designed to provide personnel with the ability to 
obtain the skills and knowledge of evolving technology in digital and multimedia 
evidence. 
• Specialized Applications and Technologies: Training in specific sub-disciplines or in 
specialized areas (e.g., cell phones, image comparison, audio authentication, 
video optimization) (Scientific Working Groups on Digital Evidence and Imaging 
Technology, 2010, p. 5). 
A digital evidence processing workshop completed in a joint effort by the Rand 
Corporation and PERF found clear support among the participants in the need to train 
investigators and all levels of staff, including patrol, detectives, and command staff.  For example, 
training on handling and preserving digital evidence "at the academy level and as part of 
investigator training would promote better evidence preservation and limit seizing devices not 
relevant to an investigation (Goodison et al., 2015).   
The author has separated training into three distinct areas: Outside Training, Internal 
Training, and Continuing Education.  Outside Training would be training from outside agencies 
such as LEVA, other Federal, State, and local agencies, or private companies such as tech or 
software companies.  SWGDE identifies this training to be beneficial in exposing officers to “new 
innovations and techniques, and assist with ensuring organizations are continuing to use best 
practices” (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016, p. 7).  SWGDE further identifies 
other avenues to obtain outside training to encompass “conferences, trade shows, professional 
organizational memberships, professional publications, current literature, and specialized 
courses or workshops” (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016, p. 7).  "Internal 
Training" is training within the department that is either available to all members or training 
specifically designed for units or members that deal specifically with digital evidence.  According 
to SWGDE, this training provides personnel with the relevant knowledge necessary to perform 
job-related tasks” (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016, p. 6).  SWGDE also 
identifies the importance of training under an experienced and competent practitioner to gain 
knowledge, experience, and improved skills (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016, 
pp. 6-7).  Finally, the "Continuing Education" section will evaluate how departments provide 
further educational opportunities to keep up to date with the most current techniques and 
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procedures.  SWGDE defines Continuing Education as "training designed to provide personnel 
with the ability to obtain the skills and knowledge of evolving technology in digital and 
multimedia evidence” (Scientific Working Groups on Digital Evidence and Imaging Technology, 
2010, p. 5).  Continuing Education can also be acquired annually from sources such as 
conferences, trade shows, professional organizational memberships, professional publications, 
current literature, and specialized courses (Scientific Working Groups on Digital Evidence and 
Imaging Technology, 2010).   
The second section of Training will evaluate the equipment provided to members.  This 
section will look at the equipment provided to members to help perform their duties, such as 
laptops, processing equipment, storage devices (USBs, DVDs), and digital cameras.  SWGDE and 
the Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science (OSAC) lists equipment they 
recommend that will assist in the acquisition of video from DVRs, such as portable computers, 
USB ports, extra monitors, and keyboards (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018, 





Internal Training Continuing 
Education 
Equipment 
Notes:     
Other 
Observations: 
    
Score:     
Total Score:     
 
The next phase in the rubric will be the Process phase which will be broken into the 
following sections: Preparation, Methods of Extraction, and Chain of Custody.  The Preservation 
section will evaluate steps taken before the actual physical extraction of evidence.  Actions such 
as anticipating physical and logical barriers to the evidence, ensuring access to the system, 
removing bystanders, isolating the evidence from remote sources, and obtaining legal authority 
to recover the evidence will help ensure evidentiary integrity and the ability to review data 
(Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, 2020, pp. 7-9).  The author will 
also evaluate if the departments identify the need to locate and preserve DME in crime scenes 
or provide procedures after discovering DME in crime scenes.   
In the Method of Extraction section, how departments utilize the most effective 
extraction methods and steps taken to verify the integrity of the video will be analyzed.  Ensuring 
their members are utilizing the most current and generally accepted extraction methods will 
ensure evidence satisfies any Frye or Daubert challenge.  LEVA recognizes there is currently not 
an extraction or acquisition standard within the industry.  The lack of standard results in the 
absence of a single best process for recovering DME (Law Enforcement and Emergency Services 
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Video Association, UNK).  However, the SOPs will be evaluated on the information they provide 
their members in assisting them in this process. 
Further factors to be evaluated will consist of steps taken during the extraction process 
to ensure the authenticity of the evidence, such as comparing the extracted data from the 
original data, verifying the correct date/time were recovered and the recovered evidence is 
playable (Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, 2020, pp. 8-21; 
Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018, pp. 8-11).  The author understands this may 
be the most challenging phase to evaluate due to departments not wanting to publish to the 
public investigative practices and procedures.  The author will also be assessing if the SOPs 
provide direction or guidance to its members where they would be able to find more descriptive 
policies or procedures. 
The final section to be evaluated 
under the Process phase is Chain of Custody.  
Once the evidence has been obtained, OSAC 
and SWGDE advise in initiating chain of 
custody according to the departments 
Standard Operating Procedures 
(Organization of Scientific Area Committees 
for Forensic Science, 2020, p. 22; Scientific 
Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018, p. 
11).  Proper documentation and following 
SOPs on chain of custody will keep the 
authenticity and integrity of the evidence 
intact and begin during the extraction phase.  
The Gallego (1960) case provides guidance on 
the importance of maintaining a proper chain 
of custody.  Like the Methods of Extraction, 
the author understands that every evidence 
handling procedure will be publicly available.  
The author will also evaluate how 
departments provide guidance on where to 
find a more descriptive chain of custody 
procedures. (See Figure B.) 











 Preparation Steps Method of Extraction Chain of Custody  
Notes:    
Other 
Observations: 
   
Score:    
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The final phase that will be evaluated in the rubric will be the Documentation phase.  This 
phase will evaluate how departments document the steps taken during the Preparation and 
Process phase.  This section will also assess how departments document the final disposition of 
the evidence, such as storage and report writing.  The first section of the Documentation phase 
to be evaluated will be the Field Notes section.  Proper field notes will help document important 
information such as location, points of contact, DVR make and model, serial numbers, date/time 
offset, number of cameras, and system settings.  SWGDE also recommends taking photographs 
of the DVR system, cameras, and setup (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018, pp. 
6-7).  (See Figure C.) 
The next section to be evaluated 
will evaluate the Final Reports produced 
from both the previous phases.  Most of 
this information can be obtained 
through proper field notes.  Along with 
information derived from the field 
notes, proper documentation of the 
chain of custody will also verify the 
authenticity of the DME.  This can be 
accomplished by documenting when 
and where the evidence was collected, 
who owned the device, and had access 
to it.  The report should address the 
chain of custody and document facts 
such as who had access to the evidence, 
who handled the evidence, and how it 
was stored (Goodison, Davis, & Jackson, 
2015).  Finally, the report should 
document any further evidence that 
was derived from the recovered DME.  
Final reports should also document any 
analytical techniques performed and 
should be thorough enough to allow a 
similarly trained person the ability the Figure C.  SWGDE Sample Field Note Form 
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replicate the techniques and reach the same conclusion (Scientific Working Group on Digital 
Evidence, 2018). 
The final evaluation will look at the final disposition of the evidence.  SWGDE identifies 
the need to transfer any evidence stored on a temporary storage device to a permanent storage 
device (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018).  It is best practice to have a policy 
that defines what data is to be archived and how long it will be retained.  There should also be a 
system to identify how the department will store the evidence, such as using optical media or 
external hard drives.  According to SWGDE (2020, p.5):  
Management of a digital evidence archive is an active, ongoing process involving 
a set of policies, practices, procedures and tools that collectively ensure archived 
information is preserved, safeguarded and remains accessible and usable for its 
entire lifecycle, from acquisition to final disposition.   
The author understands the policy of storing and accessing evidence typically is under the 
job duties of an “evidence section,” the author is looking for basic procedures in the SOPs such 
as storage options and documentation of storage along with evidence procedures. 
DOCUMENTATION Phase 
 
 Field Notes Final Reports Evidence Disposition 
Notes:    
Other  
Observations 
   
Score:    
Total Score:    
 
Data Analysis 
The author will compare the different departments' results to evaluate where they 
measure in relation to the best practices identified by the above-mentioned organizations.  The 
author chose to utilize a Likert scale from 1-5 to score how the departments' SOPs compare to 
best practices, with (1) being below average to (5) being above average.  Having a continuum of 
responses, Likert-type scales assume the responses are linear and can be measured (McLeod, 
2019).  In this study, the author will score the evaluations by how above or below average the 
department’s SOPs compare to the identified best practices.  
Scoring Table 
1 2 3 4 5 
Below Average Slightly Below 
Average 







Overview of the Sample 
The author utilized both purposive and convenience sampling to gather data for this 
analysis.  The author utilized web searches on the internet to obtain various police department 
manuals, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), or policies.  The web searches allowed the 
author to access the most easily accessible policies saving time and effort (Gray, 2014).  The 
primary web source utilized in acquiring this information came from a webpage titled “Police 
Manuals” (Ciaramella, n.d.).  This website contains various policies and procedures from 38 police 
departments across the country.  Most entries have a hyperlink next to the city's name that re-
directs the user to a department’s website with their policies and procedures.  A Google search 
for “police department policy and procedures” or “police department manuals” will return a 
listing for the “Police Manuals” website utilized in this report.  All policies and procedures used 
in this report were open to the public.  The author also utilized purposeful sampling to locate 
manuals that contained varying levels of thoroughness concerning DME in their policies.  Gray 
(2014) identifies using purposive sampling when settings are chosen because they are known to 
provide important information.  In choosing samples that varied in DME content, the author’s 
goal was to identify disparity among police departments from their DME policy.  
Six total departments were chosen based on their policy and procedures concerning 
Digital Evidence.  2 departments were selected to exhibit a Below Average level of thoroughness, 
2 showed an Average level of thoroughness, and 2 revealed an Above Average level of 
thoroughness.  The departments came from all over the country and vary in size of department 
members and size of the population they serve.  All departments evaluated in this report had 
policies and procedures that were open to the public and accessible on the internet and through 
the “Police Manuals” website.  The following departments were utilized in this study: 
• Department A: a large urban department in the Mid-Atlantic region 
• Department B: a large urban department in the Northeast 
• Department C: a medium urban department located in the West 
• Department D: a medium to large urban department located in the Southwest 
• Department E: a large urban department located in the Northwest 
• Department F: a large urban department located in the Southeast 
Limitations 
One of the limitations of this study is the small sample size.  The author only chose to 
evaluate six departments from across the country, which does not accurately reflect every 
department throughout the country.  There are numerous factors to consider when evaluating 
departments, such as the number of officers, size of the population it serves, size of the 
geographical area it covers, geographical location of the department, and many others that may 
be taken into consideration.  A large, urban police department in the northeast may not operate 
the same way as a small, rural department in the southwest.  Departments will have varying 
levels of resources available to them, affecting the staffing and equipment they can designate for 
items such as DME.   Also, there are different types of departments such as municipal 
departments, sheriff’s offices, state patrol or investigative agencies, and federal law 
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enforcement.  This report does not account for differences among the various law enforcement 
agencies throughout the United States. 
Another limitation in this study only evaluated open source policies and procedures that 
could be accessed through the internet.  This allowed for convenience but did not result in a full 
and thorough evaluation of all policies, procedures, training bulletins, guidelines, or material 
available to the various members of the departments.  Materials not open to the author may be 
more thorough and precise concerning digital evidence within the departments.  The author also 
understands the need for departments to keep some policy and procedure accessible to only 
department members.   While the lack of access to some materials may have hindered some of 
the research conducted in this study, the author utilized this opportunity to evaluate the 
accessibility of SOPs.  A police officer who may find themselves in the middle of a crime scene 
with potential DME should have the ability to access SOPs regarding DME while on scene easily.  
This will help the officer follow best practices or give the officer the information to contact 
someone to provide guidance.  A more thorough examination of all materials pertaining to policy, 
procedure, and digital evidence may have produced a different result. 
A final limitation of this study was the subjective nature of the evaluation by the author.  
The author did not utilize a published or industry standard for evaluating the departments and 
their policies concerning Digital Evidence/DME.  The author’s evaluation method was based on 
the author’s interpretation of based practices identified by industry leaders and the author's 
personal experiences handling Digital Evidence/DME.  The findings in this report are the author's 
interpretations and evaluations of the policies and procedures.  Due to the small sample size, not 
having access to all available materials, and the author's subjective review, this report lacks 







In looking at police department policies and procedures or Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs), the author began by looking for sections designated explicitly for Digital 
Multimedia Evidence or Video Evidence.  If the author could not find specific DME SOPs or related 
SOPs, the author expanded the search to include anything Digital Evidence related.  If there were 
no resources associated with Digital Evidence, the author then researched other SOPs involving 
evidence handling, forensics, crime scene duties, or follow-up procedures.  Frequently when 
there were no stand-alone DME or Digital Evidence SOP, DME or Digital Evidence information 
could be found in one or some of these other SOPs.  
Above Average Digital Multimedia Evidence SOPs 
Having a stand-alone SOP on Digital Evidence provides easy access for department 
members to find information about Digital Evidence.  Department A and Department B both had 
stand-alone SOPs specific to digital evidence.  Department A has a Special Order titled “Digital 
Video Evidence Recovery (DIVRT) Kits,” S.O. XX-XX, while Department B has a “Digital Evidence” 
SOP listed under Directive X.XX.  Both orders are 
specific to Digital Evidence and specifically to 
Digital Multimedia Evidence.  Department A also 
has a special order titled “Requesting Video 
Evidence” S.O. XX-XX, but the order focuses 
more on requesting video footage from their 
CCTV system but still may provide some 
crossover with the DIVRT order.   
Department A 
 Department A has many similarities to 
Department B when it comes to Digital Evidence 
SOPs.  Department B has provided certain 
members of their department with Digital Video 
Evidence Recovery (DIVRT) Kits and has an SOP 
specifically for using those kits.  Although there 
is beneficial information in the SOP, most of the 
information concerning Digital Evidence has to 
be gathered from other SOPs in their directives 
system.  For example, they have separate SOPs 
specifically for Outside Training and In-Service 
training.  The SOPs provide procedures for 
requesting training, procedures for records 
keeping after training, and duties for 
supervisors when outside training is requested.  
The outside training SOP also provides documents to request training as an attachment and 
RESULTS 
Figure D.  Department A Equipment List 
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instructions for their members.  The internal training SOP also provides procedures for requesting 
training, procedures for developing training, supervisor duties, and identifies mandatory 40-hour 
training yearly for sworn department members.  The internal training SOP does not include any 
forms for actions such as requesting training or developing training.  The training SOPs and the 
DIVRT SOP do not address Digital Evidence training specifically, which may be addressed in other 
directives that are not open source.  Department is the only department evaluated for this report 
that had an SOP specifically for equipment related to Digital Evidence.  The DIVRT SOP contains 
an inventory form as an attachment that lists all equipment associated with the kit.  This 
equipment inventory list includes the cases, cables and connectors, USBs and DVD/CDs, a 
camera, flashlight, laptop, a LawMate Personal Video Recorder (PVR), and guide books. (See 
Figure D.) 
 Few preparation steps were dealing with digital evidence within the department’s SOPs.  
The preparation steps in the DIVRT SOP identified steps in making sure the DIVRT kits were 
functional and operational before digital evidence retrieval.  All other SOPs dealing with crime 
scene response, evidence collection, and criminal investigation provided general procedures with 
nothing specific to DME.  When it comes to extracting DME, there is generic information in the 
DIVRT SOP, such as filling out forms and uploading recovered evidence.  The retrieval 
documentation form does identify important information from the system that should be 
addressed during extraction: DVR make 
and model, number of cameras, and DVR 
offset.  Similarly, when it comes to 
managing Chain of Custody, the DIVRT SOP 
does not contain specific sections 
concerning Chain of Custody. Still, the 
retrieval documentation form contains an 
entire “Audit Trail” section for 
documentation.  The author was able to 
locate other SOPs detail the proper 
collection and handling of evidence that 
included a “general property record” form 
to document chain of custody.  
Department A provides its 
members with a retrieval documentation 
form that is ideal for use as field notes.  (See 
Figure E.)  The form is a very descriptive 4-
page document that includes all the 
relevant information needed in digital 
multimedia evidence recovery: make, 
model, serial number, date/time offset, 
number of cameras, passwords, etc.  The 
DIVRT SOP does not detail procedures for 
final reporting, but there are other SOPs 
within the directives that detail procedures 
Figure E.  Department A Documentation Form 
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for final documentation.  These SOP’s define procedures for documenting the uploading of video 
or who is responsible for final case files; however, they do not specifically mention procedures 
for final reporting on DME.  Similar to final reporting SOPs, the DIVRT SOP identifies for its 
members related general evidence SOPs for proper inventorying procedures.  These are general 
SOPs and do not contain specific information about digital evidence.  Department A’s numerous 
SOPs accessible to the public are very detailed; however, the author found that some were very 
outdated. There seemed to be a lot of information across numerous SOPs.  It would be helpful to 
have more of the various details on digital evidence in one SOP.   
Department B 
 Department B Directive X.XX scored very well in most sections of the Rubric created by 
the author.  Department B had the most extensive training information in their SOP with a 
dedicated section titled “Required and Accepted Training” within Directive X.XX.  The training 
section lists approved outside agencies for training in Digital Evidence and identified training that 
might come from interdepartmental sources.  Although the directive does not list actual training 
courses, the directive specifies the need for training. It outlines the responsibility for Department 
B’s Office of Forensic Science to keep up with industry standards and best practices.  When it 
comes to the Equipment section, Department B was average in relation to the other 
departments.  Directive X.XX didn’t specifically itemize equipment available to members but did 
notate within the order, “All ‘Department B’ issued tools and equipment have been removed and 
collected.”  The directive advises “personnel that they will not exceed the scope of their training 
(i.e., DIVRT training covers the extraction of video from DVRs, not cell phones),” which tells the 
author that Department B personnel have access to equipment. 
 Department B Directive X.XX was very advanced compared to the other departments in 
relation to the Process section of the evaluation.  Department B once again had a section titled 
“Preparing to Recover Digital Evidence.”  The directive identifies the need for personnel to obtain 
permission to access the device or have legal authority before recovering digital evidence.  A “DE 
Recovery Form” (xx-xxx) and a “Recovery Log” (xx-xxx) are identified in the preparation section 
of X.XX.  Throughout the entire directive, Department B identifies the need to canvas for digital 
evidence, the procedure for notifying the correct responding personnel, and who is authorized 
to recover digital evidence.  When it comes to the extraction process in Directive X.XX, the 
directive also has a section titled “Recovery of Digital Evidence.”  Although most of this section 
appeared to the author to be more in line with computer-related evidence, the directive provides 
other valuable procedures such as photographing equipment before recovering, moving, or 
disturbing electronic devices.  Department B identifies the need to follow the most current SOPs 
when recovering evidence due to the rapidly changing and evolving pace of technology.  
Department B also identifies the need to recover evidence in their “native, unaltered format” 
and document all procedures and actions taken when that is not possible.  The directive then 
identifies procedures for requesting forensic examinations and the responsibilities of those 
conducting forensic examinations.  Department does a nice job of addressing Chain of Custody 
issues with digital evidence.  All digital evidence is stored in their Digital Evidence Management 
System (DEMS), described as a virtual evidence room.  It is a secure location for digital evidence 
with only authorized access. All user actions are logged and audited; all evidence has an audit 
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trail as well as receiving a hash value upon entry into the system.  According to the directive, all 
data will be stored redundantly in case of a catastrophic system failure.  The directive refers to 
“the most current SOPs for complete user information on DEMS” but did not give a directive/SOP 
number or a hyperlink to the SOP; therefore, the author could not access it. 
 Directive X.XX provides personnel 
with two Digital Evidence Recovery 
Forms, Form xx-xxx-Digital Evidence 
Recovery Form and Form xx-xxx-Digital 
Evidence Recovery Form (Digital Video).  
(See Figure F.)  Form xx-xxx is the more 
generic form used on all digital evidence, 
while Form xx-xxx is more specific to 
Digital Multimedia Evidence.  Form xx-xxx 
covers many of the vital information 
needed to recover Digital Evidence, such 
as make, model, serial number, 
username/password, DVR offset, number 
of cameras, and retention time.  Along 
with providing the forms, the directive 
also provides instructions within the SOP 
on what information should be filled out 
by recovering personnel.  The directive 
does not address final reporting 
procedures; however, with the 
information obtained in the field notes 
and recovery forms, most of the pertinent 
information needed for a final report will 
be easily accessible from these forms.  Finally, 
along with the chain of custody information 
provided throughout the directive, there is a section titled “Retention and Purging.”  This section 
assigns evidence disposition responsibilities to a “Digital Evidence Custodian” who will safeguard 
and manage “digital evidence created, collected, or otherwise utilized by the XXXXXX Police 
Department.”  The section also identifies the need to conduct periodic audits and reviews of their 
DEMS system to ensure digital evidence is submitted, stored, and purged responsibly.   
Average Digital Multimedia Evidence SOPs  
Department C 
 In the previous two departments, we have seen strong examples of having well-written 
SOPs addressing Digital Multimedia Evidence.  The following two departments demonstrate 
average SOPs where they are above average in some areas and below average in other areas.  
Department C has a specific digital evidence order titled “Recovering Digital Media Evidence.”  
This SOP touches upon a few of the essential topics related to digital multimedia evidence but is 
not as detailed as the previously analyzed departments.  The order does not contain a training 
Figure F.  Department B Retrieval Form 
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section or define any training specific to digital evidence.  The department does have a training 
SOP that contains standard training information.  It defines inside and outside training, 
responsibilities for members seeking training, and responsibilities for training personnel.  The 
SOP identifies forms to be filled out for actions such as requesting training.  However, it does not 
provide an example of the form within the SOP or a hyperlink to the form.  Regarding identifying 
equipment for digital evidence, the digital media evidence SOP does not have anything specific 
to digital evidence.  The SOP identifies members from a criminal analysis unit to convert 
recovered video in a playable format that would require some equipment but does not explicitly 
mention which or what type of equipment. 
 In evaluating Department C’s SOPs to the Process phase of the rubric, Department C’s 
SOPs contain general procedures with few pertaining specifically to DME.  In identifying 
preparation steps for recovering digital evidence, the digital media evidence SOP outlines the 
need for an investigator to accompany recovering personnel to the location of recovery.  The 
investigator is also responsible for providing the date, time, and location of digital media 
evidence.  The SOP also identifies the need for recovery personnel to recover digital media 
evidence in accordance with their training and best practices but does not provide any more 
information.  The department has other SOPs that cover general crime scene and investigator 
responsibilities, chain of custody, and evidence handling procedures, but these SOPs do not 
contain information or policies specific to DME.  According to the digital media evidence SOP, the 
Crime Analysis Unit is responsible for recovering digital evidence. Still, the author could not locate 
any SOPs pertaining to this unit in Department C’s policy system.  From the information provided 
from the various SOPs, the author could not find any procedure information concerning the 
extraction or chain of custody of DME. 
 When it comes to documenting field notes and final reporting, Department C’s SOPs 
provide general information and do not provide a lot of detail.  For example, the SOP identifies a 
recovery request form and a digital evidence recovery form but does not provide a copy as an 
attachment or a hyperlink.  The author was unable to view these forms to evaluate their content.  
The SOP also identifies the need to document the recovery of digital evidence in police reports 
but does not provide specifics such as a format, required content, responsible personnel, etc.  
The SOP also identifies another specific SOP for a forensic report for computers and other digital 
evidence. Still, the link to view the SOP within the policy system was inactive.  According to the 
digital media evidence SOP, the final disposition of evidence procedures can be found in a 
separate SOP which covers general evidence handling procedures.  The forms identified in the 
digital evidence SOP may be comprehensive and contain good information that will allow 
recovery personnel to document the recovery in a very detailed manner.  For having an entire 
SOP specific to digital multimedia evidence, the author felt it was too generic and not specific 
enough to DME.   
Department D 
 Department D does not have an SOP specific to digital evidence or DME from what was 
available to the general public in their online policies and procedures webpage.  An SOP that 
contained digital evidence information can be found in their SOP titled “Crime Scene Duties.”  
Although it would be easier to have a stand-alone SOP specific to digital evidence, the SOP does 
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have specific sections related to the recovery of digital evidence.  Similar to other departments, 
Department D has a separate SOP that covers all training within the department.  Besides the 
initial training to be a licensed law enforcement member, Department D also identifies in-service 
training, roll-call training, specialized training, and career development.  Most training is provided 
within the department but does allow for officers to seek training outside the department when 
it is beneficial to the member and not available through Department D.   Department D has a 
Training Academy Online web portal, along with a Career Development Program through the 
portal which was restricted to members of the department.  The author was unable to locate any 
information specific to training and equipment within the SOPs.  The online training academy and 
Career Development Program may provide much more information to members that are not 
accessible to the public. 
 The Crime Scene Duties SOP contains two specific sections covering digital evidence: 
“Crime Scenes Where Video Recordings Are Made” and “Preservation of Digital Evidence.”  The 
“Preservation of Digital Evidence” section is more associated with recovering computers and 
computer-related equipment. Still, it does provide some reasonable preparation steps for dealing 
with all digital evidence, including digital multimedia evidence.  The measures include having tech 
personnel on scene prior to executing a search warrant, guidelines for when officers first 
encounter digital storage devices, and documenting all actions taken when members manipulate 
devices.  The “Crime Scenes Where Video Recordings Are Made” section provides some 
preparation steps before extracting evidence, such as contacting whoever is in charge of 
recording location and notifying a supervisor when denied access.  The SOP offers very little 
information about the extraction process of digital evidence and reminds officers to maintain 
chain of custody when recovering video recordings.  The latest update to the SOP was in 2014, 
but the author noticed the SOP repeatedly referred to VHS tapes throughout the SOP.   
 The Crime Scene Duties SOP lists referenced documentation forms but does not provide 
examples or hyperlinks.  All other processes for documentation are generic and do not specifically 
mention DME.  The only information the author was able to locate concerning documentation 
and digital evidence was in an SOP about digital photography.  This SOP dealt with Department 
D’s members documenting physical evidence or observable crime scene detail with the 
department's equipment.  The SOP had some practical procedures for digital multimedia 
evidence such as documenting name and badge number of the person producing the evidence, 
the date and time it was put onto a storage device and distinguishing between the “master” copy 
and copies.  However, this SOP was strictly related to Department D self-documenting crime 
scenes or other important circumstances of a case and not directly with digital evidence.  Finally, 
when detailing the final disposition of evidence, the crime scene duty SOP describes the 
procedure for delivering master video recordings along with reports to a specific location within 
the headquarters building.  For any other information concerning evidence handling, Department 
D members can look to other SOPs that supply generic evidence handling procedures but nothing 
specific to digital evidence.  Department D did create a section within their crime scene duty SOP 
to provide information on recovering and handling digital evidence. Still, the information 
contained within the SOP was not very thorough.  The SOP could use updating with its vocabulary, 
procedures, and documentation to be more effective.  
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Below Average Digital Multimedia Evidence SOPs  
Department E 
 The last group of departments evaluated did not have any specific digital evidence SOPs 
or digital evidence sections within other SOPs similar to Department D’s crime scene duty SOP.  
Department E did not have any specific SOPs or sections within an SOP that dealt directly with 
digital evidence.  The author evaluated various SOPs within Department E’s policy system for any 
SOPs that might contain any information concerning digital evidence.  The author began by 
evaluating Department E’s training SOP to check for any information that may be useful to 
training and digital evidence or DME.  Department E’s training SOP contained generic training 
information with nothing specific to digital evidence. The training SOP was similar to the other 
departments’ SOPs, with general information provided about outside training, internal training, 
and continuing education.  In looking at Department E’s directive system, the author could not 
find any information that identified equipment in relation to digital evidence.  There was one SOP 
within their system related to equipment, but the SOP was more specific to returning 
department-issued equipment upon separation from the department.    
 Continuing to look within Department E’s SOP system, the author was also unable to find 
anything specific to digital evidence and the Process phase of the rubric.  Since there was no SOPs 
specific to digital evidence, the author searched other SOPs such as crime scene investigation 
and homicide/investigation units for information that may be relevant to the process of handling 
digital evidence.  Those SOPs identified steps for conducting investigations and procedures to 
follow were nothing concerning preparing, extraction, or handling digital evidence.  The 
department had very detailed evidence handling SOP that provided procedures for maintaining 
chain of custody but did not include anything relative to digital evidence in the SOP. 
 While looking through the other SOPs within Department E’s system, the author found 
various forms identified within those SOPs that are to be used by members when documenting 
investigations.  These forms included basic incident reports to a summary of investigation 
reports.  The author was unable to locate the content of these forms through the SOP system, a 
hyperlink was not included, and the forms were not provided as an attachment to the SOP.  The 
author was able to find one mention of DME in an SOP detailing homicide investigation 
procedure.  In that SOP, members were advised which items of the investigation file should be 
included.  This identified items such as lab reports, interviews, crime scene sketches, autopsy 
reports, and “digital media.”  A definition of “digital media” was not provided, and the author 
was unable to locate any other sections within the SOP that mentioned “digital media.”  Just as 
in the chain of custody section, the author found very detailed SOPs concerning evidence 
handling and disposition, but nothing that specific to digital evidence.   
The author found one SOP that had a promising title but was quick to find out that it did 
not provide the information relevant to this report.  The SOP was about the department’s video 
center, which is the city and department’s CCTV system in public areas.  This is the city and 
department run CCTV program and all the information provided was procedure in handling the 
CCTV system with no information about third-party digital evidence.  The department also has 
an 11-page SOP for cybercrime.  This SOP provides excellent information with the investigation, 
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recovery, handling, and storage of computer equipment.  This SOP provides a lot of the 
information being sought for digital multimedia evidence acquisition but is almost entirely about 
computer-related equipment and does not provide information on video-related computer 
equipment such as DVRs.  It would be easy for Department E to add information pertaining to 
DME to this SOP. 
Department F 
 The evaluation of the final department’s manual produced one SOP about photo 
evidence.  The SOP states the policy applies to the creation and preservation of photographic 
evidence but does not define photographic evidence.  From evaluating the SOP, the author felt 
the SOP was defining procedure for taking and handling photographs produced by department 
members.  The beginning of the SOP states the policy addresses when members obtain digital 
photographic and video evidence from a third party; however, the information provided is highly 
minimal. 
The only training brought up in the photo evidence SOP is the training employees will 
receive on Digital Single-lens Reflex (DLSR) camera systems and investigative photography 
techniques.  Although this training may provide some beneficial information regarding digital 
evidence, this training appears to be designed to train members in the use of DSLR cameras to 
document crime scenes and evidence.  The author looked at other training SOPs within the 
system, which provided information on external and internal training and continuing education.  
The author could not locate any training specific to the recovery or handling of digital evidence 
within the department’s policies.  For equipment provided to members to help with digital 
evidence, the photo evidence SOP identifies the DSLR cameras and smartphones, “department-
supplied devices,” and media cards.  The SOP does not identify or further describe the 
department-supplied devices but states employees will use them to capture photographic 
evidence.  Members are also provided with imaging processing software to help document crime 
scenes, but the SOPs do not identify the software. 
 When it comes to preparing for digital evidence, there is nothing in the department’s 
SOPs to guide their members in preparation for digital evidence.   There is also nothing in the 
SOPs when it comes to extracting or obtaining digital evidence.  In the photo evidence SOP, there 
is a section for dealing with the collection of third-party photographs.  However, this section only 
identifies that these photos can be uploaded to the Digital Evidence Management System (DEMS) 
and provides procedures for doing that.  The photo evidence SOP does not address the issue of 
chain of custody when dealing with digital evidence.  The author looked to evidence procedures 
within the department system and found the department’s SOPs provide a link to the state patrol 
forensics services guide for proper evidence collection procedures.  The state patrol guide 
provided detailed chain of custody procedures but nothing specific to digital evidence.    
 The photo evidence SOP does not provide any information in the documentation of photo 
evidence or procedures for final reporting on the evidence.  The only form mentioned in the SOP 
was a photo media envelope used when submitting evidence from a media card when the DEMS 
system is not functioning.  Looking through the SOPs for final reporting procedures revealed 
procedure stating case files must follow standards set forth by the States Attorney office with 
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nothing specific to digital evidence.  The photo evidence SWOP primarily contains procedures for 
how members upload or enter their photo evidence in either their DEMS system, a DEMS web 
kiosk, or a third-party storage provider.  The entire SOP primarily refers to photos or photographic 
evidence and does not mention video or and other digital multimedia evidence. 
Further, the state patrol forensic services guide provides evidence submission and general 
guidelines for collecting, preserving, and packaging physical evidence. Still, it does not offer any 
specific procedure for digital evidence.  The author was also able to find a state patrol “high tech 
crimes unit” section within the forensic services guide. Still, the unit only assisted departments 
with support and training in cell phones, computers, cameras, SD cards, and other digital storage 
devices.  This unit within the state or other units with the department could provide digital 
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This report aimed to identify best practices for handling digital multimedia evidence using 
federal and state rules of evidence, legal opinions, and industry leaders as a guideline.  By 
comparing the best practices established by industry leaders with the guidelines put forth by the 
courts and legal opinions, the author will utilize the data from the evaluations to come up with 
recommendations.  These recommendations will concentrate on best practices within police 
departments when creating SOPs for digital multimedia evidence.  The author purposefully chose 
SOPs with varying degrees of thoroughness in their procedures for digital evidence to develop 
areas where SOPs need improvement and areas where SOPs are strong and can be used as an 
example for other departments.  By having solid SOPs that comply with industry best practices, 
current legal requirements will allow departments to conduct better investigations, minimize 
court challenges, and stay up to date with technology that is constantly changing. 
Digital Multimedia Evidence – Training 
 Evaluating the training procedures outlined in the department’s SOPs, which are 
accessible to the public, was challenging.  Understandably, departments may not list all training 
requirements, topics, or methods in general SOPs.  Specific training material may be kept within 
a training unit. For example, DME training may be located in the Forensics Unit or in another unit 
responsible for handling digital multimedia evidence.  In evaluating the six departments, 
Department A and Department B both included a fair amount of information about training in 
either their DME-specific SOP or general training SOP.  Department B listed for their members 
outside agencies that the department approves for DME training.  Department A has SOPs 
explicitly designated for outside training and internal training that provide information.  The 
Department A outside training SOP even included forms for requesting outside training in the 
SOP.  Department A and Department B both identified the need to continue education by stating 
the need to keep up with technological changes and stating the number of yearly training hours 
members are to receive.  The department’s commitment to putting these training requirements 
and information in writing shows they understand the importance of utilizing best practices 
identified by SWGDE.   
Departments need to ensure their members are using validated technologies and 
methods and have an understanding of any new findings, equipment, techniques, and legal 
developments (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2016).  By having the training 
information listed in general training SOPs or the DME SOP, every member in the department 
can find information that may help them obtain the training needed to handle DME.  As 
Goodison, Davis, and Jackson (2015) discovered in their workshop, all levels of staff need to be 
trained in DME.  Good training information within either a DME-specific or training SOP will help 
provide all members the information needed to acquire such training.  The other departments 
all had similar training SOPs that provided training information such as methods for requesting 
additional training, forms for requesting training, yearly training hours required, and even online 




DME, so they were given a lower evaluation.  However, if the author had more access to the 
training materials and SOPs, the departments' evaluations might be rated higher. 
 Training is significant in handling DME because the member handling the evidence may 
be called on to authenticate the evidence at some point during legal proceedings.  The methods 
and techniques utilized by the member must be able to pass a Frye or Daubert challenge.  
Showing the court the training received by the member provided the member with up-to-date 
methods and techniques will help satisfy any Frye or Daubert challenge.  In Munoz, one of the 
seven requirements for introducing evidence was the fact the operator was competent in the 
operation of the device.  The court in People v. Taylor provided a similar requirement by looking 
at the operator's competency in deciding factors for a proper foundation.  Training according to 
best practices in the operation of recording devices will show the members competency in 
handling the device and the evidence it produces.    Further, the member may be called to trial 
to provide testimony as an expert witness under FRE 702.  Proper training is the first step that 
will allow the member to prove they are qualified by their knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education (Cornell Law School, n.d.).     
 Just as training is essential to show the member is utilizing current best practices and 
techniques, the proper equipment utilized by the member is a critical component of handling 
digital evidence.  Like training, it is understandable that departments might not list all equipment 
available to members in SOPs accessible to the public.  Equipment may be further defined and 
detailed in unit-specific SOPs.  Looking at the evaluations of the departments, some of the SOPs 
still provide helpful information that departments should utilize.  Department A provides trained 
members with the Digital Video Evidence Recovery (DIVRT) kits and an inventory form with all 
equipment in the kit listed.  This allows members to easily use a “grab n go” kit containing all the 
necessary equipment needed to handle DME.  Along with an inventory checklist where members 
can visually confirm the equipment, the members will be fully equipped to handle DME in the 
field. 
 While analyzing the other departments’ SOPs, the author was able to identify other 
equipment available to those departments’ members that is beneficial in DME.  Items such as 
stand-alone laptops and digital cameras to document crime scenes can be highly beneficial when 
working with DME.  Laptops with admin privileges allow members the ability to download 
propriety software to play videos.  Digital cameras allow members to document the area where 
the video systems are located, the video system, and any identifying markings, date/time offset, 
and the display screen with the number of cameras and camera views.  From personal 
experience, documenting these factors is very important. It allows a member the ability to check 
information such as date/time offset and camera view to make sure the evidence recovered is 
what was being sought after.  Taking pictures allows the member, along with good field notes, to 







Digital Multimedia Evidence – Process 
 The Process phase begins with evaluating the preparation taken before the actual 
recovery of the evidence.  It is essential to prepare to handle evidence by understanding what 
evidence is being sought, where the evidence is located, legal authority, and the timeframe to be 
recovered.  SWGDE identified the need to obtain proper legal authority before seizing or 
acquiring video evidence and specifically mentions referring to organizational policy regarding 
requirements for obtaining authority (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018).  
Department B had an entire section within their digital evidence SOP directed at the preparation 
of digital evidence.  It outlined the importance of identifying legal authority, evaluating the 
system, and determining the data to be recovered.  Department C’s SOP also identified the need 
for members to be provided the date, time, and recovery location.  Proper preparation and 
understanding of what is to be recovered will provide the member with the information needed 
to ensure they minimize authentication issues in the future. 
 Other steps for preparation identified in the SO’s that were not specific to digital evidence 
were the need to properly canvas crime scenes for evidence. Expressly, members should be 
advised in their SOPs the need to identify DME similar to the way they are trained to identify 
other forms of evidence such as fingerprints or DNA when responding to crime scenes.  SWGDE 
recognized the importance of determining the physical location of the recording device, the 
date(s) and time(s) of interest, and any expected storage media needs before any acquisition 
(Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2018) (Scientific Working Group on Digital 
Evidence, 2021).  By identifying locations of DME along with the necessary information about the 
location of the DME such as owner, availability for access, system info will provide responding 
personnel responsible for recovering the evidence the information needed to perform their 
duties.  SWGDE (2021) also recommends being proactive by contacting businesses and citizens 
in high-volume call areas to build community relationships to expedite video recovery.  In most 
of the SOPs detailing crime scene duties, the author observed that the SOPs did not specifically 
identify DME when looking for or protecting evidence in a crime scene.   
 The extraction phase of recovering DME is the first time members begin handling the 
evidence.  The departments did not have very descriptive extraction procedures listed in their 
SOPs.  Department A and Department B provided the best procedure by identifying the need to 
photograph the equipment, providing documentation forms to fill out during the extraction 
process, and identifying the need to extract the evidence using best practices and in the native 
format when possible.  LEVA (n.d.) recognizes the need for SOPs to be sufficiently detailed but 
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not be so rigid that members are not 
allowed any flexibility.  As we have seen 
from court cases such as People v. Taylor 
(proper operation of the device, 
explanation of the copying or duplication 
process), State of Maryland v. 
Washington (evidence not authenticated 
because an unknown person derived it by 
an unknown process), State of New Jersey 
v. Nieves (authentication not possible due 
to a lack of timeline and without reliable 
identification as to time, place, date, 
individuals and activities) and 
Commonwealth v. Connolly (did not lay a 
proper foundation for authentication 
because it did not present evidence to 
show the date, time, or location of the 
video), the extraction process is vital to 
proving the authenticity of the evidence. 
Identifying basic procedures and 
best practices for extracting the DME will 
provide the member sufficient guidance 
to get the job done and allow them the 
flexibility to deal with any issue that may 
arise during the process.  Members should have already received training to have the skills and 
techniques, and knowledge of processes that have been identified from best practices to 
effectively extract the evidence (Scientific Working Groups on Digital Evidence and Imaging 
Technology, 2010).  A flow chart may be helpful in the SOP to allow members that do not have 
as much training as technicians to complete basic extraction methods when situations do not 
allow more trained personnel to do the extraction.  A flowchart provides a visual aid providing 
members easy-to-follow procedure.  (See Figure H.) 
 All departments contained Chain of Custody information within their SOP system, either 
in their DME SOP or in their general evidence handling SOPs. Department A had an audit trail 
section within their retrieval documentation form to document chain of custody.  Department 
B’s evidence storage system also contained an audit trail and logged user actions to help maintain 
the integrity of the video.  US v. Taylor and Hicks (chain of possession), US v. Gallego (court does 
not have to produce all witnesses who were in a position to come into contact with evidence), 
People v. Taylor (showing the manner the recording was preserved), State of Maryland v. 
Washington (lack of testimony to chain of custody),  and State of New Jersey v. Nieves 
(authentication not possible without explicitly eliciting a chain of custody) demonstrate the 
importance of establishing and documenting Chain of Custody.       
Figure H.  SWGDE Workflow Example 
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Department B’s SOP also assigned a hash value to all DME.  Department B is creating the digital 
chain of custody by assigning a hash value that will help with any future challenges to 
authentication and integrity.  The courts have recognized the accuracy and reliability of using 
Hash values in cases such as Glassgow, Mikenvich, and Wellman. Furthermore, SWGDE (2019) 
identifies the importance of integrity verification for maintaining chain of custody and 
recommends hashes be made as early as possible in the collection of evidence.  By creating the 
hash value and starting the chain of custody, departments can verify any copies of the evidence 
and identify any changes made to the evidence.  
Digital Multimedia Evidence - Documentation 
 Documentation is a crucial component to proper DME handling and recovery.  
Documentation connects all the other phases and processes and is essential for providing details 
that may be needed in the future.  Good documentation in the form of field notes is also an 
integral part of completing any final reporting procedures.  The SOPs that received the highest 
scores in the evaluations all provided a documentation form within the SOP.  The documentation 
forms contained important information such as time offset, DVR make/model and serial number, 
number of cameras, retention time, general notes, and audit trail information.  This aligns with 
the suggested items to be documented from SWGDE (Scientific Working Group on Digital 
Evidence, 2018) and OSAC (Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, 
2020).  Descriptive field notes allow for easier final report writing.  The author has had to write 
numerous final reports where he relied on extensive field notes to complete the final report.  
Some reports consisted of multiple locations of recovery with DME produced from various 
sources.  The ability to refer to well-documented field notes and also utilize pictures of the 
systems was beneficial.  Most SOPs that were evaluated did not have specific final reporting 
procedures but mostly identified the need to document the facts of the case.  Final reporting 
procedures may be covered in more detail in unit-specific SOPs so the author was not surprised 
to see very little information concerning final reporting.   
 Finally, when it came to the evidence disposition section of the Documentation phase, 
the highest-rated SOPs contained detailed policy on the responsibilities of evidence disposition.  
Department B’s SOP identified a digital evidence custodian responsible for retaining, auditing, 
and purging the evidence.  The SOP also identified the need to ensure all pertinent and viable 
evidence is adequately safeguarded.  The other departments all had general evidence SOPs that 
discussed evidence disposition along with chain of custody.  Due to the unique nature of digital 
multimedia evidence, such as the different ways it can be stored: optical disc, USB, hard drives, 
or cloud service, as well as issues such as the ability to access the evidence, it will be necessary 
for departments to have strong DME policies in evidence disposition and storage.  SWGDE (2020, 
p.6) provides a summary of best practices for archiving DME: 
1. Define in policy what data the organization requires to be archived for how long it must 
be retained 
2. Have a system to keep track of what is in the archive, where it is stored, and for 
validating its integrity 
3. Choose storage that appropriately meets the organization’s needs 
4. Have redundancy, preferably geographically dispersed 
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5. Have policy, plans, and procedures for: 
a. Identifying personnel responsible for managing the archive 
b. Adding data to the archive 
c. Retrieving data from the archive 
d. Ensuring archived content will be accessible when needed for full retention period 
e. Removing data from the archive when no longer needed  
 One of the limitations of this report was the inability to access every SOP or policy manual 
from the departments evaluated.  Only SOPs accessible through the internet, which didn’t require 
any permission or special clearance, were used.  It is understandable if departments do not want 
to make all investigative SOPs publicly available.  Departments should consider identifying in their 
general SOPs where members can find all pertinent procedure information within department 
resources.  During the evaluations, the author could not access specific procedures and forms 
because the hyperlink directed the author to a department login web.  This would provide 
members direct access to material and would also ensure security for the materials. 
Other Considerations 
 Following SWGDE, LEVA, government reports, and other industry leaders for best 
practices provides detailed guidance for handling DME.  It is advisable to follow these guidelines; 
however, law enforcement personnel will have to balance the need to follow best practices and 
outside factors that are situationally dependent.  Every case and every location where DME may 
be recovered is different.  The members handling DME will have to balance the need to follow 
best practices along with the needs of home and business owners who may be providing access 
to their systems.  Not every home or business owner will understand DME best practices and the 
actions taken by law enforcement personnel.  It may appear to them that law enforcement 
personnel are damaging or changing their system in the process of recovery.  They may not like 
their system info and/or personal info being documented and possibly photographed.   
Business owners have to balance the need to run a business as well as assist law 
enforcement.  The author has recovered DME in numerous businesses where the recording 
system was behind the counter or in public view of the customers.  Anyone in the store could 
observe the author or any other law enforcement personnel while they were in the process of 
extracting DME.  To avoid this, members can close the store or prevent access to certain areas of 
the store.  But this may cause the business to lose customers or draw more attention to the 
store’s assistance with law enforcement.  Law enforcement personnel need to balance the need 
of the business owners with procedures for handling DME.  In certain high crime areas, the 
business owners are more than willing to assist with law enforcement and balance the perception 
of helping the police from the community.  Some businesses keep their video systems in the 
ceiling or other hard-to-reach areas to deter any equipment tampering.  Sometimes the video 
systems are located in an office with other computer equipment or merchandise on top of it.  
Personnel should always attempt to leave the systems in the exact condition they found it.  
Therefore, it may be hard to take pictures of the information on the box without risking the 
possibility of moving and damaging equipment.  The more extended law enforcement personnel 
are in a business, the longer they may be drawing attention to that business.   
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Similarly, homeowners may be worried about retribution from gangs or criminals for 
helping law enforcement.  This may cause them to be hesitant to provide personal information 
or allow access to their system.  The author has experienced situations where the offender(s) 
have lived on the block or next door to locations with video cameras.  The author has had to 
recover DME from buildings where possible offenders were residing.  Homeowners have 
requested the author come at certain times and take a particular path to get to the house.  Proper 
preparation can sometimes alleviate some of these issues.  Knowing what evidence is needed, 
such as date and time of occurrence and camera angles or numbers of cameras, can expedite the 
extraction process.  Contacting businesses or homeowners if their information is known 
beforehand will provide them the opportunity to help when it is convenient for them.   This also 
avoids wasting the members' time by heading to a location to discover they cannot get access to 
a system.  The goal should be for law enforcement personnel to work with home and business 
owners on recovery procedures to maintain a positive relationship, so they continue to assist in 
future investigations.   
 Caseload may be another factor that affects the ability of members to collect, extract or 
analyze DME.  Most departments evaluated in this report came from medium to large size 
departments from urban areas.  Departments in large metropolitan areas with high crime rates 
will have different caseloads than small rural departments with low crime rates.  Staffing and the 
number of members either trained or tasked with handling DME will vary from department to 
department.  A department with a small amount of trained personnel that serves an area with 
high crime rates may have a different caseload than the smaller rural department with the same 
number of trained personnel.  This is why it is important to have easily accessible and 
understandable SOPs to help when personnel that may not have a lot of training or experience 
with DME are given the task due to various situations.  It is another reason why the SOPs should 
be “sufficiently detailed but not be so rigid as to not allow for flexibility” per LEVA (Law 
Enforcement and Emergency Services Video Association, n.d., p. 4).  
The author works in a large urban department in an area with high crime rates.  The 
author's location will often have nights when multiple homicides require a response.  The 
members in the author’s unit have to balance the need to respond to these crime scenes with 
the existing follow-up work for other homicide and violent crime cases.  The author’s unit may 
have to triage the amount of work due to caseload and staffing.  We may not be able to recover 
DME and complete a full report all in one shift.  A homicide investigation may contain numerous 
locations or multiple crime scenes that may take weeks to follow up.  Various forms of DME may 
need to be recovered and compiled, such as surveillance video, Body Worn Cameras, red 
light/speed cameras, and third-party videos such as YouTube or video posted on social media.  
These situations present different challenges than responding to a burglary scene with a two-
camera video system in a rural area.  On the other hand, where the author has numerous 
members in his unit, there are officers in rural departments who are the only individual tasked 
with handling DME in either the entire town, city, county, or region.   Allowing flexibility in SOPs 
will enable members to follow best practices and make decisions that best handle each case's 
different scenarios.  
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This report only looked at department SOPs concerning general handling of DME but did 
not go into the numerous types of DME or the nuances of handling each type.  When creating or 
updating SOPs, it will be beneficial to consider all kinds of video recording systems and video 
sources in the world today.  With the explosion in the use of social media, platforms such as 
Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube can provide information of evidentiary value.  Newer 
surveillance systems targeting homeowners that utilize cloud technology have also seen a 
dramatic increase.  Cloud-based systems such as Ring are providing homeowners with the ability 
to share video directly with law enforcement through email, text, or their applications like the 
Ring Neighbors App. 
Additionally, SOPs should address other areas where DME can be obtained and provide 
material of evidentiary value.  Red-light cameras, speed cameras, ATM cameras, and cellphone 
cameras all can capture evidence.  These methods of capturing video must be addressed along 
with traditional forms such as DVRs. 
One of the significant obstacles in properly handling DME within police departments 
comes down to money.  It costs a lot of money to receive training, procure equipment, and keep 
up with all of the technological advances.  It may be necessary for departments to obtain outside 
funding to help with all the costs associated with adequately handling DME if they do not already 
have systems in place.  The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) recommends pooling 
resources such as joining federal task forces and creating regional computer forensic labs or 
fusion centers to help smaller or rural departments that may not have the resources available to 






 After reviewing the literature and evaluating the various departments’ SOPs, the author 
offers the following recommendations to assist police departments in establishing best practices 
for the acquisition and handling of digital multimedia evidence in their SOPs.  It is the author’s 
recommendation to have a stand-alone SOP to deal specifically with digital evidence or DME; 
however, these recommendations should be taken into consideration for a stand-alone SOP or a 
specific DME section within another SOP.   
Recommendation #1: Establish a training protocol to teach and maintain DME best practices  
 To keep up with the constantly changing world of technology, law enforcement personnel 
must understand the various technologies they will be working on.  This begins with training and 
continues while working with DME to stay on top of the latest techniques and tools.  The training 
should contain the categories identified by SWGDE’s (2010, p.5) recommendations for personnel 
who collect, preserve, analyze, and/or examine digital evidence:  
• Awareness 
• Skills and Techniques 
• Knowledge of Processes  
• Skills Development for Legal Proceedings (Witness Testimony & Forensic Results 
Preparation) 
• Continuing Education 
• Specialized Applications and Technologies 
By developing SOPs along these guidelines will help establish the competency of the 
members working with DME.  This will help satisfy any questions as to the skills and abilities of 
the personnel handling DME.  In cases where members may be called in as an expert witness, 
proper training help satisfy the standards outlined in FRE 702.  Being trained and the ability to 
show certificates in current technologies will also help address any future Frye or Daubert 
challenges that may be brought up. Certifications of training and knowledge in currently accepted 
best practices by the member will go towards the admissibility of the evidence for either of these 
challenges.   
The SOP should also address any procedure for members who may want to request future 
training.  This may include attaching “request forms” for training, procedures for requesting 
training and having a list of approved training vendors or providers.  Department B identified 
approved outside training vendors such as the International Association (IAI), LEVA, National 
Technical Investigators Association (NATIA), and the FBI Forensic Audio, Video and Image Analysis 
Unit (FAVIAU).  In addition to these organizations, there are numerous others such as the 
Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory (RCFL), run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the 
National Domestics Communications Assistance Center (NDCAC),  the National White Collar 
Crime Center (NW3C), the National Cyber Crime Conference and the National Computer 
Forensics Institute (NCFI,) run by the United States Secret Service.  For a list of searchable training 




Bureau of Justice Assistance (International Association of Chiefs of Police, n.d.).  In addition to 
these organizations, private technology vendors also provide training and certificates in their 
technology to handle DME. 
The SOP should not need to address every training aspect of working with DME but should 
be an available resource for any member who may have questions about DME training 
procedures.  Goodison et al. (2015) identified the need to expand training to all department 
members and beyond the introductory level.  This may avoid excess requests for evidence 
recovery and increase efficiency, improve evidence preservation and help manage expectations 
on how quickly evidence can be obtained.  More formal training DME policy and procedure for 
work in a forensic lab or unit specifically tasked with working with DME should contain more 
detailed training SOPs.  If we look at Department B’s digital evidence SOP as a guide, the SOP 
identified an approved list for outside training vendors and identified who was responsible for 
keeping up with policy and procedures to be current with best practices.  It also identified 
procedures for managing and recording any certifications/training received by members.   
Recommendation #2: Provide easily accessible basic DME acquisition SOPs available to all 
members of the department  
 Not every item of DME will have the ability to be recovered or handled by a member who 
has been trained in the proper procedures in DME acquisition.  Staffing, caseload, situational 
circumstances may require members who have minimal to no training in DME to be responsible 
to recover that evidence.  It will be essential to have easy-to-follow general DME handling 
procedures for situations when trained personnel cannot respond.  This should allow for a first 
responder who comes across evidence the ability to identify DME, document the essential 
information relative to the DME, attempt an extraction of the DME, understand any urgency of 
DME recovery such as retention time, as well as understanding the proper procedure for notifying 
the follow-up units.  Some important areas to address: 
• Retention time 
• DVR make, model, serial number 
• Number of cameras/camera angles 
• Date/time offset 
• Owner info 
• Usernames/passwords 
Identifying important extraction information will benefit the untrained members and 
assist them in getting information that will help responding follow-up personnel who have 
training.  For the author, it is vital to get the evidence while the opportunity is available instead 
of waiting for follow-up personnel to make a recovery.  Depending on circumstances, waiting 
may result in the loss of the evidence through data retention issues or human interference 
(deletion).  Therefore, the SOP should provide basic procedures to allow for minimally trained 
personnel to identify DME and attempt an extraction or make notification to extract.  The 
workflows provided in Appendix C provides a framework used as a template to help illustrate 
basic extraction procedures. 
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One issue that connects training and extraction methods is equipment.  Department 
members should have the proper equipment to handle DME and be adequately trained in any 
specialized equipment they use.  For General SOP guidance, the SOP should address everyday 
equipment needs for the extraction of DME.  Items such as storage media (USB drives, optical 
disks), felt tip markers, extra mouse and keyboard, flashlight, and a department-issued 
smartphone to document DME equipment, could all be identified in SOPs.   The SOP should also 
specify how the equipment can be utilized to collect, extract, and preserve DME.  For 
departments, writing digital evidence unit-specific SOPs, more advanced equipment such as 
laptops, extra connection cables, keyboards, and monitors may be addressed.  Any unit tasked 
with handling digital evidence will also require equipment for processing the digital 
evidence/DME, such as specialized computers, monitors, software with licenses, and storage 
solutions.   
Recommendation #3: Provide documentation forms along with procedure for properly 
documenting DME acquisition 
 Proper documentation is a vital component in the collection, extraction, and preservation 
of DME.  Documentation provides a record of the equipment the DME was extracted from, what 
methods were used, inventory procedures, etc.  Proper documentation can also help with issues 
related to the ability to playback the video, chain of custody, and any future forensic analysis 
performed on the recovered material.  Good documentation can address any issues as to the 
integrity or authentication of the video. 
Documentation forms such as field notes or retrieval forms should be provided directly in 
the SOP as either an attachment or through a hyperlink.  This will allow members easy access to 
forms and enable members to bring them into the field to utilize while working with DME.  This 
allows the member to document in real-time and provides a guide on what information should 
be collected.  The forms should contain all relevant information needed for extraction, such as 
make and model, retention time, username and passwords, date/time offset, and any other 
pertinent information deemed necessary by the department.  These documentation forms will 
also assist in any future final reporting required of members working with DME.         
Properly documenting chain of custody and providing a hash value to any recovered DME 
will speak to the integrity of the evidence.  This is valuable in proving that a particular piece of 
evidence is the original and has not been altered in any way.  There are times when evidence 
does need to be shortened, resized, or brightened for many reasons.  Providing proper 
documentation to any changes made to the original evidence to allow a third party the ability to 
complete the same steps and get the same result will show the reliability of the data.  Good 
documentation can provide important information as to the authenticity of the evidence.  By 
documenting specific aspects of the acquisition like date/time offset, camera angles, and 
including pictures of the camera views and device information, will help show the data is what it 
purports to be.  Utilizing hash values at the time of acquisition will help document the 




Recommendation #4: Secure funding to pay for training, equipment, and other operational 
needs. 
 The recommendations made in this report will not be cheap to implement.  Training and 
equipment cost money.  With municipalities tightening their budgets and other areas in the 
police department competing for budget money, additional funding sources will be needed.  For 
example, LEVA’s website lists its level 1 training costs at $1,100.00 for law enforcement personnel 
and $2,000.00 for private-sector employees (Law Enforcement & Emergency Services Video 
Association Internation, Inc., n.d.).  Some organizations provide free training, such as NCFI and 
NW3C, but free training should not be the sole source. 
 Equipment is another significant expense with proper DME handling.  Computer 
equipment built to handle the high volume of data processing will be required, and laptops for 
any fieldwork.  Other equipment such as storage media, extra cables, monitors, keyboards, and 
other previously mentioned equipment will have to be supplied to members.  Licensing will for 
any processing programs or equipment will also have to be accounted for.  Members will also 
have to receive training to use any of these processing programs.  It is also advisable to have a 
secure lab and workspace for members handling DME.  This space will have to include features 
such as internet connection and security features to ensure the integrity of the evidence.  
Another option is to join partnerships with other agencies or tasks such as regional task forces to 
lower costs. 
 Archiving evidence can also be costly.  SWGDE recommends utilizing online servers for 
large data volumes as well as third-party hosted storage.   Online servers or networked storage 
require hardware, maintenance, and electrical/climate control costs to become very expensive.  
Hosted storage options have recently seen their prices reduced.  However, the amount of 
redundancy and speed, and frequency of retrieval will involve recurring costs that will increase 
with the volume of the stored data (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2020).  
Departments will also have to factor in these costs that may annually increase if the volume of 







The video of the death of George Floyd provided a powerful account of the incidents from 
May in 2020.  Along with the other available video from that night, the evidence against Derek 
Chauvin was overwhelming.  This case highlights the importance of identifying and recovering 
video evidence from crime scenes.  It can be such an essential part of the evidence that police 
departments should be handling video or Digital Multimedia Evidence (DME) with techniques 
and procedures with best practices that industry leaders recognize. 
 The constant changing of technology presents a challenge for the courts and legal system 
to keep up.  When the technology that produces the evidence is changing rapidly, how do 
departments prepare their members for these changes?  Having strong, flexible Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs) helps address the change that is constantly occurring with 
technology.  This study identified several important areas in collecting and handling DME by 
evaluating industry best practices along with current legal guidelines.  Several recommendations 
were made to guide police departments in developing SOPs to address those issues.  While the 
recommendations are a beginning to the proper handling of DME, the author feels further 
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Appendix A – Evaluation Rubrics 
Methodology Form: _______________________ 
TRAINING Phase 





   
Other Observations:     
Score:  
 
   
Total Score:  
 








































 Outside Training Internal Training Continuing Education Equipment 
Notes: -Have a training SOP 





-nothing specific to 
DME 
-Training SOP also 
identifies internal training 
-nothing specific to DME 
 
-Training SOP (nothing 
specific to DME) 
-defines “Roll Call” and 
“In-Service” Training 
-nothing specific in 
SOPs in relation to 
DME 
 














 Preparation Steps Method of Extraction Chain of Custody  
Notes: -Nothing DME specific in 
SOPs 
-Nothing in SOPs about DME Very good detailed description of 
Chain of Custody in SOP but 
nothing specific for DME 
Other Observations: -SOP about Crime Scene Investigation discusses developing an investigative plan, outlining specific 












 Field Notes Final Reports Evidence Disposition 
Notes: -nothing about field notes and 
nothing specific to DME 
 
-SOP identifies need to list 
evidence 
-identifies what should be in 
report but nothing specific to 
DME 
 
-General evidence SOP but 
nothing specific to DME 




-Crime Scene Investigation APD.SOP .3081 has an entire section about Photographs and Videotape 
Information but it only discusses photo/video taken by APD personnel of crime scenes 







Total Score:  
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Methodology Form: ___Department A_____________ 
 
TRAINING Phase 
 Outside Training Internal Training Continuing Education Equipment 
Notes: -Entire SOP on 
requesting outside 
training 
-includes forms for 
requests 
-not DME specific 
 
-Whole SOP on in-
service training 
-not DME specific 
 
 
-SOP states members 
should receive at least 
40 hrs of training yearly 
 
-Dept issues DIVRT 
kits to members 
-kit includes a large 
amount of equipment 
-also have stand-alone 
laptops 
-DIVRT kit inventory 
form 
Other Observations: -DIVRT (Digital Video Evidence Recovery) Kit 













 Preparation Steps Method of Extraction Chain of Custody  
Notes: -a few preparation steps 
-mostly deals with getting 
DIVRT kits ready 
-SOP dealing with the 
management of Criminal 
Investigations is outdated 
(1987) 
 
-Documentation form identifies 
Make, Model, # of cameras, DVR 
offset which is consistent with best 
practices 
-No written process in policy 
 
-have a “Audit Trail” section in 
the Retrieval Documentation 
Form 












 Field Notes Final Reports Evidence Disposition 
Notes: -DIVRT SOP provides officers 
with the Retrieval 
Documentation Form 
-very descriptive, 4 pages 
-also a PD81 form, Property 
Record Form 
 
-SOP identifies process of 
uploading video and how to 
document 
-Identifies a “Crime Scene 
Examination Case File” that 
would have all relevant reports 
included 
-No specific mention of DME 
-DIVRT SOP directs reader to 
Evidence SOP for proper 
inventory procedures 
-General Evidence SOP, nothing 
else specific to DME 
Other  
Observations 
-A lot of information across numerous SOPs, would be nice to have DME pertinent information located 








Total Score:  
13 
 




Methodology Form: ___Department C_____________ 
 
TRAINING Phase 
 Outside Training Internal Training Continuing Education Equipment 
Notes: -Have a training SOP that 
defines outside or external 
training 
-identifies dept form to 
request outside training 
-nothing specific to DME 
-Training SOP also 
identifies internal training 
-nothing specific to DME 
 
-Training SOP (nothing 
specific to DME) 
-defines “Roll Call 
Training” 
-nothing specific in SOPs 
in relation to DME 
-Recovering Digital 
Media Evidence SOP 
discusses Criminal 
Analysis Unit (CAU) 
having ability to convert 
video, must have some 
equipment/programs 
Other Observations: -Recovering Digital Media Evidence SOP states CAU members who have been trained are allowed to convert.  Only 















 Preparation Steps Method of Extraction Chain of Custody  
Notes: -SOP outlines role of Investigator 
to provide info to recovery 
personnel 
-SOP identifies need to provide 
date, time, location of DME 
recovery 
-SOPs cover general crime 
scene/investigator 
responsibilities, nothing DME 
specific 
 
-SOP identifies the need to recover 
DME per training and best practices 
-nothing specific to what training is or 
best practices 
-SOP covers general Chain of 
Custody procedures 
-nothing specific to DME 
Other Observations: -HPD has an entire SOP called “Recovering Digital Media Evidence” (SOP 1.17) 
-not as thorough for being an entire SOP specific to DME, could add more info  
-Have a Crime Analysis Unit but unable to locate SOP or info about it 









 Field Notes Final Reports Evidence Disposition 
Notes: -SOP identifies Digital Multimedia 
Evidence Recovery Form HPD-
503 
-unable to access 
-should add hyperlinks directly to 
SOPs for forms 
-SOP identifies need for 
documenting recovery of DME in 
police report but not specific 
 
-General evidence SOP but 
nothing specific to DME 
Other  
Observations 
-Does identify “Crime Analysis Request Form” HPD-107B and Computer & Digital Forensic Report SOP 8.18 







Total Score:  
9 
 
Final Score: ___29_______ 
  
64 
Methodology Form: ___Department B_____________ 
 
TRAINING Phase 
 Outside Training Internal Training Continuing Education Equipment 
Notes: -Identifies outside agencies 
approved for training in 
DME 
 
-Digital Evidence SOP 
repeatedly mentions training 
-identifies that some training 




-SOP identifies the 
importance of keep up with 
technology with changes at 
a rapid pace 
 
-SOP mentions “PPD 
issued tools and equipment” 
in regard to recovering 
DME but does not list 
specific equipment 
Other Observations: -SOP identifies DME as possible evidence at crime scene 
-SOP identifies procedure for managing and recording certifications and training related to DME 
-SOP identifies responsibility of Office of Forensic Science (OFS) to keep policies and procedures up to date and compliant 
with current best practices 
-Ensures will keep an “Approved Training List”  













 Preparation Steps Method of Extraction Chain of Custody  
Notes: -SOP identifies need for legal 
authority before recovering DME 
-identifies procedure for 
“responding personnel” to canvas 
crime scene for Digital Evidence 
and look specially for digital 
surveillance systems 
-identifies only trained personnel are 
authorized to recover DME 
-has entire section titled (Preparing 
to Recover Digital Evidence) 
 
-entire section titled “Recovery of Digital 
Evidence” 
-section geared a little more towards 
computers but a lot of crossover with 
DME 
-identifies need to photograph DME 
equipment 
-identifies need to recover using best 
practices and in native format if possible  
-All digital evidence is stored in their 
Digital Evidence Management System 
(DEMS) 
-DEMS is secure storage with its own 
SOP 
-authorized access only 
-all user actions logged and 
periodically audited 
-audit trail for chain of custody 
-all digital evidence receives a hash 
value 
 
Other Observations: -SOP identifies outside agencies that may be helpful in assisting in recovery or examination of digital evidence 












 Field Notes Final Reports Evidence Disposition 
Notes: -SOP identifies a DE Recovery 
Form, 75-665 
-attaches a copy of form to SOP 
-provides a process for filling it out 
-specific section on surveillance 
video 
-Have a DE Recovery Form (Digital 
Video), 75-656 that identifies DVR 
make, model, offset, # of cameras, 
retention time, notes, etc 
-SOP does not specifically mention 
final reporting  
-recovery forms and SOP section 
covering recovery form identifies 
important information need to be 
notated 
-SOP has an entire section titled 
“Retention and Purging” 
-identifies a “Digital Evidence 
Custodian”  
-identifies periodic audits and 
reviews 
-identifies need to ensure pertinent 




-would be nice to have a hyperlink to DEMS  
 
Score: 5 3 5 
Total Score: 13 
 
 








 Outside Training Internal Training Continuing Education Equipment 
Notes: -SOPs allows for 
officers to apply for 
outside training 
-No SOPs in relation to 
outside training and 
DME. 
 
-Have a SAPD “Training 
Academy” that is online 
through SAPD web 
-appears to be a good 
resource for additional 
training 




-SOP identifies 40hrs of 
training to be done 
yearly for officers 
-Nothing specific to 
DME 
 
-nothing specific in 
SOPs in relation to 
DME 
Other Observations: -SOPs do have small paragraphs that define “Specialized Training” and “Career Development” but nothing 
specific to training and DME 
-SAPD has a “Career Development Program” offered through to dept to officers. Access through SAPD web 














 Preparation Steps Method of Extraction Chain of Custody  
Notes: -SOPs identify actions for 
officers in “Crime Scene 
Duties” SOP.   
-very narrow duties 
-SOP gives process for handling 
some DME but appears to be more 
geared towards VHS 
-not very specific 
-seems outdated 
-SOPs cover general procedures 
for documenting chain of custody  
-identifies basic chain of custody 
procedures 
-nothing specific for DME 
Other Observations: -have an entire section titled: “Crime Scenes Where Video Recordings are Made” 
-entire section seems out of date, numerous mentions of VHS 









 Field Notes Final Reports Evidence Disposition 
Notes: -Have numerous forms listed but 
unable to access 
-all processes of documenting 
are generic, no DME 
 
-entire SOP about reporting: 
offense/incident/ supplemental 
-nothing specific to DME 
-identifies where reports can be 
found but unable to access 
-Describes a “Videotape 
Receptacle in Headquarters 
Building where final master 
copy is to be dropped off 
-all other SOPs are generic to 




-evidence disposition seems out of date with “Videotape Receptacle” 







Total Score:  
9 
 
Final Score: ___27_______ 
  
66 
Methodology Form: ___Department E_____________ 
TRAINING Phase 
 Outside Training Internal Training Continuing Education Equipment 
Notes: -Have a training SOP 
that encourages further 
training 
-states officers 
SHOULD be provided 
with 30hrs of training a 
year 
-nothing specific to 
DME 
-Training SOP also 
identifies In-service 
training as standard 
straining 
-classes provided to 
update training 
-nothing specific to DME 
 
-Training SOP (nothing 
specific to DME) 
 
-SOPs identify 
smartphones for taking 
pics and media cards but 
used to document crime 
scenes 
-nothing specific to 
DME 
 
Other Observations: -SOP titled Photographic Evidence 7.090 states employees will receive training but it is only in regard to dept. 
DSLR cameras to document crime scene 














 Preparation Steps Method of Extraction Chain of Custody  
Notes: -Nothing DME specific in 
SOPs 
-minor description of drop-off 
procedure of computers to 
Forensic Lab, not DME related 
-SOP has a good process description 
for submitting photos for evidence, 
not DME related 
-SOP provides info about 
documenting chain of custody but 
not DME related 
-Washington State Patrol Forensic 
Services Guide has paragraph 
detailing chain of custody but not 
DME related 
Other Observations: -Washington State Patrol Forensic Laboratory Services Bureau has a “High Tech Crimes Unit” but only 
specifically mentions Cell Phones 













 Field Notes Final Reports Evidence Disposition 
Notes: -only mention is a “Canvass 
Card” for documenting witness 
information 
 
-only mention is that Case Files 
should satisfy standards set forth 
by States Attorney office and 
published by Criminal 
Investigations Bureau 
 
-General evidence SOP but 
nothing specific to DME 
-detailed description of dealing 
with photos produced for 
documenting crime scene 
Other  
Observations 
-SPD has a very detailed SOP titled Photographic Evidence but it only deals with photographic evidence 









Total Score:  
5 
 
Final Score: ___15______ 
  
67 































Appendix C – Workflow Examples 
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